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ABSTRACT 
The Effect of a Corporate Name Change Related to a Change in Corporate Image  
upon a Firm’s Stock Price. 
(August 2006) 
Mark P. DeFanti, B.A., Amherst College; 
M.B.A., The University of Texas at Austin 
Chairman of Advisory Committee: Dr. Paul S. Busch 
 
 
This dissertation utilizes the event study methodology from the modern theory of 
finance to examine corporate name changes (CNCs). Data sources include press releases 
and articles announcing CNCs compiled by Lexis Nexis, annual reports collected from 
the SEC File microfiche database compiled by Q-Data and the EDGAR database 
compiled online by Mergent, and the Center for Research on Stock Prices and 
COMPUSTAT compiled by Wharton Research Data Services.  
These data sources are used to answer three primary research questions. First, 
what is the effect of a CNC related to a change in corporate image, as opposed to a 
change in corporate entity (e.g., acquisition), on a firm’s stock price? Second, what is the 
effect of a major change versus a minor change to the corporate name during a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image? Third, what is the effect of a non-brand name 
altering CNC versus a brand name altering CNC on a firm’s stock price? 
This dissertation makes its primary contribution to the study of CNCs by finding 
that CNCs related to a change in corporate image will have a positive impact on stock 
 
iv 
price whereas CNCs related to a change in corporate entity will not. Moreover, it finds 
that major changes to the corporate name during CNCs related to a change in corporate 
image will have a positive impact on a firm’s stock price whereas minor changes to the 
corporate name during CNCs related to a change in corporate image will not. Finally, it 
is the first study to examine the effect of CNCs on firms’ brand names and finds that 
non-brand name altering CNCs related to a change in corporate image will have a 
positive impact on a firm’s stock price whereas brand name altering CNCs related to a 
change in corporate image will not. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
Importance of the Problem 
1Numerous large U.S. firms have changed their corporate names since 1966.  
Some well publicized examples include Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) to Exxon, 
International Harvester to Navistar International, Consolidated Foods to Sara Lee, 
Dayton-Hudson to Target, UAL to Allegis to UAL, Allegheny Airlines to US Air to US 
Airways, U.S. Steel to USX, Connecticut General and INA to CIGNA, United Aircraft 
to United Technologies, Philip Morris to Altria, Time Warner and AOL to AOL Time 
Warner to Time Warner, KPMG Consulting to BearingPoint, and Andersen Consulting 
to Accenture. 
A corporate name change (CNC) can be very costly. Legal fees, printing of new 
stationery and packaging, signage, and advertising can amount to hundreds of millions 
of dollars.  For example, the change by United Airlines’ parent company from UAL to 
Allegis was reported to have cost $7.3 million, excluding the cost of promoting the new 
name (Ellis 1987). The change from International Harvester to Navistar is estimated to 
have cost $13 to 16 million (Bennett 1986). The change to Unisys after the merger of 
Burroughs and Sperry in 1986 was estimated to have cost up to $15 million in 
advertising, printing, signs, and other costs (USA Today 1987). In addition, the change 
from Esso to Exxon cost a staggering sum of approximately $200 million (McQuade 
1984). More recent examples include Andersen Consulting to Accenture at an estimated 
cost of $13 million (Stuart and Muzellac 2004) with a supporting advertising budget of 
                                                 
1This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Marketing. 
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$170 million (Callahan 2002), and KPMG Consulting to BearingPoint at an estimated 
cost of $20 to 35 million (Callahan 2002; Stuart and Muzellac 2004). 
 Given the magnitude of the investment required, it is not surprising that CNCs 
receive a lot of attention. CNCs have been both praised and criticized by the business 
press and academic researchers. Observing that Consolidated Foods experienced a 
substantial increase in its stock price during the year after the firm changed its name to 
Sara Lee, Charmasson (1988) suggested that Consolidated Foods resolved its company 
identity crisis by adopting one of its most successful brand names. Other researchers 
have found CNCs to have an immediate and statistically significant, positive impact on 
firms’ stock prices when they added .com to their corporate names before mid-2000 
(Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004; Lee 
2001) or deleted .com from their corporate names after mid-2000 (Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004). On the other hand, Howe (1982) found no statistically 
significant stock price reaction associated with CNCs and concluded that managers need 
not worry about keeping a firm’s name up to date because there is no net benefit to 
changing a corporation’s name.   
Primary Research Questions 
This dissertation examines the antecedents and financial consequences of CNCs 
by publicly traded firms from 1987 to 2002. Data sources for this dissertation include 
announcements of CNCs made through company press releases and the business press 
compiled by Lexis Nexis, the firms’ annual reports collected from the SEC File 
microfiche database compiled by Q-Data and the EDGAR database compiled online by 
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Mergent, as well as the Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT 
compiled by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
These data sources are used to answer three primary research questions. This 
dissertation examines prior research on the effect of a corporate name change (CNC) 
related to a change in corporate image upon a firm’s stock price. In doing so, it aims to 
answer three primary research questions. First, what is the effect of a CNC related to a 
change in corporate image, as opposed to a change in corporate entity (e.g., acquisition), 
on a firm’s stock price? Second, what is the effect of a major change versus a minor 
change to the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image? 
Third, what is the effect of a non-brand name altering CNC versus a brand name altering 
CNC on a firm’s stock price? 
Contributions of This Research 
 Drawing from the theoretical concepts of information processing (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983), brand heritage (Aaker 
2004), brand awareness (Aaker 1991), perceived risk (Capon and Burke 1980; Cardozo 
and Cagley 1971; de Chernatony 1989; Dunn, Murphy, and Skelly 1986; Fowler 1982; 
Granzin 1981; Guseman 1981; Hawes and Barnhouse 1987; Mitchell 1999; Mitchell and 
Greatorex 1989; Mitchell and McGoldrick 1996; Moore and Lehmann 1980; Perry and 
Perry 1976; Roselius 1971; Taylor and Rao 1982; Toh and Heeren 1982; Tootelian, 
Gaedeke, and Schlacter 1988; Wu, Holmes, and Alexander 1984), and signaling theory 
(Spence 1973). It is argued that by failing to distinguish between CNCs related to a 
change in corporate image and a change in corporate entity and non-brand name altering 
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and brand name altering CNCs, several researchers may have overgeneralized when they 
concluded that a CNC does not affect a firm’s stock price or that the distinction between 
a major change and a minor change to the corporate name does not matter.  
 This dissertation classifies a change to the corporate name as major when the 
new corporate name is not immediately recognizable as related to the previous corporate 
name because the new corporate name includes words or letters that are drastically 
different from those used by the previous corporate name (e.g., Andersen Consulting to 
Accenture) and as minor when the new corporate name is immediately recognizable as 
related to the previous corporate name because the new corporate name includes words 
or letters that are highly similar to those used by the previous corporate name (e.g., US 
Air to US Airways). Next, it classifies a CNC as related to a change in corporate image 
when it results from an increase or decrease in the corporate name’s affiliation with an 
industry, brand, business unit, event, attribute, or geographic region. It then classifies a 
CNC as related to a change in corporate entity when it results from a merger, acquisition, 
divestiture, reorganization, or change in ownership. Finally, it classifies a CNC as brand 
name altering when it results in a change in one or more of the brand names in the firm’s 
portfolio (e.g., Software Technologies Corporation to SeeBeyond).  
Following the lead of other researchers of CNCs (e.g., Bosch and Hirschey 1989; 
Ferris 1988; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Lee 2001; Madura and Tucker 1990; 
Morris and Reyes 1991), this dissertation adopts the event study methodology from the 
modern theory of finance to analyze the effect of 183 CNC announcements on the 
behavior of stock prices. In doing so, this dissertation makes its primary contribution to 
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the study of CNCs by showing that: 1) a CNC related to a change in corporate image has 
a positive impact on stock price whereas a CNC related to a change in corporate entity 
does not; 2) a major change to the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in 
corporate image has a positive impact on a firm’s stock price whereas a minor change to 
the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image does not; and 
3) a non-brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate image has a positive 
impact on a firm’s stock price whereas a brand name altering CNC related to a change in 
corporate image does not. By investigating these questions, this dissertation both 
expands and refines the previous research on CNCs. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been several studies of the financial impact of various marketing 
phenomena in the marketing, management, finance, and economics literatures. The 
motivation for this research was, in great part, to bridge the gap between marketing and 
finance and provide managers with normative implications of their marketing decisions. 
This section begins with a review of the conceptual contributions of previous event 
studies of marketing phenomena. Next, the conceptual and empirical contributions of the 
subset of the 13 event studies dealing with CNCs are reviewed. Then, the conceptual 
limitations of these CNC event studies as well as the general limitations associated with 
the event study methodology are assessed. Finally, this section concludes with a review 
of another substantial literature stream of conceptual articles that identifies the key 
characteristics of corporate names (i.e., distinctiveness, flexibility, memorability, 
relevance, and likeability). Since this dissertation’s conceptual model is focused 
primarily on CNCs related to a change in corporate image, previous research examining 
several concepts related to corporate image, including identity, intended image, 
construed image, and reputation, as well as the antecedents of CNCs is reviewed in the 
next section. 
Previous Event Studies of Marketing Phenomena 
 Several event studies of marketing phenomena other than CNCs have been 
conducted in the marketing, management, and economics literatures. As indicated in 
Table 1, they have examined the effect on firms’ stock prices of independent variables 
related to: 1) branding such as brand extensions (Lane and Jacobson 1995);  
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2) independent variables related to advertising such as advertising expenditure 
announcements (Chauvin and Hirschey 1993), firing advertising agencies (Kulkarni, 
Vora, and Brown 1993; Hozier and Schatzberg 2000), advertising to investors (Bobinski 
and Ramirez 1994), celebrity endorsement contract announcements (Agrawal and 
Kamakura 1995), advertising slogan change announcements (Mathur and Mathur 1995), 
announcements of initiating new advertising agency-client relations (Mathur and Mathur 
1996), the announcement of Michael Jordan’s return to the NBA (Mathur, Mathur, and 
Rangan 1995), Internet advertising of services announcements (Mathur, Mathur, and 
Gleason 1997), Super Bowl advertisements (Kim and Morris 2003), supply chain 
management announcements (Filbeck, Gorman, Grenlee, and Speh 2005), and Clio 
creative advertising award announcements (Tippins and Kunkel 2006); 3) independent 
variables related to sponsorships including Olympic Games sponsorship announcements 
(Miyazaki and Morgan 2001); sponsoring the winning driver of the Indianapolis 500 
(Cornwell, Pruitt, and Van Ness 2001), corporate stadium sponsorship announcements 
(Clark, Cornwell, and Pruitt 2002), NASCAR sponsorship announcements (Pruitt, 
Cornwell, and Clark 2004), and major league sports’ official product sponsorship 
announcements (Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark 2005);  
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4) independent variables related to distribution channel management such as internet 
channel addition announcements (Geyskens, Geilens, and Dekimpe 2002); and 5) 
independent variables related to innovation and product announcements (Eddy and 
Saunders 1980), product recall announcements (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Jarrell 
and Peltzman 1985), new product innovation announcements (Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991), new product introduction delay announcements (Hendricks and Singhal 
1997), new “green” product announcements (Mathur and Mathur 2000), new product 
pre-announcements (Mishra and Bhabra 2001), and radical innovation announcements 
by pharmaceuticals (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003).  
These 27 studies’ major findings, theoretical contributions, theoretical 
limitations, methodological contributions, and methodological limitations are 
summarized in Table 1. The very first study found was Eddy and Saunders (1980), 
which was an early effort to integrate decision making in the finance and functional 
marketing areas with an event study of the effect of new product announcements on 
monthly stock prices. Thereafter, beginning with Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), the event 
studies shifted to the use of daily stock returns as the independent variable. 
In addition to the improvement in measurement, the subject of analysis by event 
studies has also evolved.  Interestingly, the studies listed from 1980 to 1991 (Chaney, 
Devinney, and Winer 1991; Eddy and Saunders 1980; Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; 
Jarrell and Peltzman 1985) all examine phenomena related to the “product” aspect of the 
marketing mix.  These studies range from product recalls to new product innovations. 
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After 1991, however, the scope of event studies expanded to include the vast array of 
other advertising and marketing issues listed above.  
In addition to the progression of scope shown in these event studies, the 
conceptual contributions and limitations of the analysis have likewise progressed.  Many 
of these studies have shown a statistically significant effect on stock prices, which range 
from the -5.25% average stock price return of a delay in new product introduction 
(Hendricks and Singhal 1997) to the 3.71% average stock price return for advertising 
agencies that were hired by a firm after that firm had announced the termination of its 
previous agency (Kulkarni, Vora, and Brown 2003). 
In many cases, the methodological contributions and methodological limitations 
of the studies summarized in Table 1 can be generalized to all event studies. As a result, 
they are discussed in further detail in the forthcoming discussion pertaining to the 
methodological limitations pertaining to CNC event studies. 
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TABLE 1 
EVENT STUDIES OF MARKETING PHENOMENA 
  Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Eddy and 
Saunders (1980) 
Decision Sciences 
66 
announcements 
1961-69 
New product 
announcements 
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant stock price 
effects measured by 
cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) before 
and after the 
announcement date 
Contributions. Early 
attempt to integrate 
decision making in the 
marketing and finance 
functional areas 
Limitations. Use of weekly 
stock returns may have 
caused finding of 
statistically insignificant 
effects 
Jarrell and 
Peltzman (1985) 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
32 
announcements 
by 26 drug firms 
1974-82  
116 
announcements 
by 3 auto firms; 
1967-81 
Product recall 
announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant 
negative adjusted CARs 
for all windows for drugs 
• Statistically significant, 
negative adjusted CARs 
of -1.83% for autos in  
(-5, +5) 
Contributions. Product 
recall announcements 
by drug and 
automobile 
manufacturers 
penalized shareholders 
far more than the 
direct costs of the 
recall campaigns. 
Competitors are also 
adversely affected 
when a rival product is 
recalled 
Limitations. 
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 
(1988) found that results 
were affected by departures 
from traditional event 
study methodology. 
Sample included events 
with overlapping event 
windows (e.g., the effect 
on Chrysler’s stock price of 
a Ford recall 
announcement occurring 
during the same event 
window as a recall 
announcement by Chrysler) 
 
Hoffer, Pruitt, 
and  Reilly  
(1988)  
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
66 recall 
announcements  
1975-81 
 
Product recall 
announcements 
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant effects for 
automobile 
manufacturers 
 
 
Contributions. 
Reclassified Jarrell and 
Peltzman’s (1985) data set 
and revised their 
methodology by removing 
from the sample any events 
with overlapping event 
windows in order to agree 
more closely with 
traditional event study 
methodology  
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Chaney, 
Devinney, and 
Winer (1991) 
Journal of 
Business 
1,101 
announcements 
by 231 firms 
1975-84 
New product innovation 
announcements   
• Stock price 
• Average daily CARs 
for (-1, +1) of 0.25% with 
5 of the 10 years showing 
a statistically significant 
effect 
(-3, +3) is 0.12%  
(-5, +1) is 0.11%  
(-5, +5) is 0.06%  
Contributions. 
Found that the impact 
of a new product 
introduction varied 
negatively with the 
firm’s systematic risk 
and the number of the 
new product 
announcements. Also 
found that the market 
reacted positively to 
multiple product 
announcements as 
opposed to single 
product 
announcements and 
truly new products as 
opposed to copycat 
products. 
Contributions. 
Identified four limitations 
of the event study 
methodology: 1) Stock 
prices have noise; 2) Event 
dates may not be easily 
identifiable; 3) Events may 
cluster; 4) Many events do 
not have a statistically 
significant impact on the 
firm. 
 
Limitations.  
Firms in sample may differ 
from the average firm in 
their field in terms of size, 
advertising expenditures, 
and capital expenditures to 
assets ratio, leverage ratio, 
and P/E ratio.  
Chauvin and 
Hirschey (1993) 
Financial 
Management 
1500 firms  
1988-90 
Advertising and R&D 
expenditures 
• Stock Price 
 
Contributions. 
Found that advertising 
and R&D expenditures 
positively impact stock 
prices and can be 
viewed as an 
investment in 
intangible assets. 
Contributions. 
Tested the model for 
independent and interactive 
effects of the percentage of 
closely held shares (i.e., the 
share of stock held by 
insiders and large outside 
interests) to rule out a lack 
of congruence between 
managerial and stockholder 
interests. 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Bobinski and 
Ramirez (1994) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
99 ads 
Advertisements to 
Investors 
• Stock Price 
• Statistically 
insignificant effects of   
-0.214% on day 0 (day of 
advertisement) and  
-0.134% on day 1 
• Statistically significant, 
positive increase in 
trading volume for 49 
small capitalization firms 
for (-1, 0) 
• Statistically significant, 
positive increase in 
trading volume for all 99 
firms for (3,20) 
Contributions. 
Found increases 
(mainly for small 
capitalization firms) in 
trading volume at the 
initial appearance of 
an ad, but not during 
subsequent 
appearances. 
Contributions. 
Reviewed effect on trading 
volume as well as stock 
price 
 
Limitations. 
Incorrectly characterized 
the examination of the 
relationship between 
advertising to investors and 
stock market reaction as 
having a short-term 
perspective. Stock price is 
a forward-looking measure 
that indicates a long-term 
perspective 
Agrawal and 
Kamakura (1995) 
Journal of 
Marketing  
110 
announcements 
of 87 celebrities 
by 35 firms  
1980-92 
Celebrity endorsement 
contract announcements  
• Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive overall effect 
(0.54%) for (-1, 0) 
Contributions. 
Extended the previous 
literature, which 
focused on the 
celebrity 
endorsements’ effect 
on consumers’ brand 
attitudes and purchase 
intentions, by 
examining the 
economic value of the 
announcements of 
celebrity endorsement 
contracts 
Contributions. 
Performed tests for 
industry effects, skewness 
in CAR distribution (with 
Corrado’s (1989) 
alternative nonparametric 
rank test), and 
percentage of positive and 
negative CARs 
 
Limitations. 
Defined the event day as 
the first day an 
announcement of a contract 
or a forthcoming celebrity 
endorsement contract 
appeared in the print media 
rather than the press release 
date 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Lane and 
Jacobson (1995) 
Journal of 
Marketing 
89 
announcements 
by 59 brands 
owned by 34 
firms  
1989-90 
Brand extensions  
• Stock price 
• Non-monotonically 
related to brand attitude 
and brand familiarity 
• Statistically significant, 
positive 
mean CAR of 0.3216% 
• Correlation between 
familiarity and excess 
return of .23663.  
• Correlation between 
esteem and excess return 
of .23546 
Contributions.  
Empirically tested 
investors’ reactions to 
brand extensions 
Contributions. 
Departed from typical 
event studies by identifying 
the relative impact of 
multiple brand extension 
alternatives and the 
conditions under which 
brand extensions affect 
stock prices  
Mathur and 
Mathur (1995) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
87 firms  
1987-92 
 
Advertising slogan 
change announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant CAR of 
0.12% for (-1, 0) 
• Statistically significant 
positive CAR of 1.03% 
for (-1, +10)  
• Average increase in the 
market value of a firm of 
$96 million 
• $6 million in profits to 
the firm (given average 
price to earnings ratio of 
16) 
Contributions. 
Statistically 
significant, positive 
results during (+2, 
+10) suggested that 
judicious use of 
advertising slogan 
changes is beneficial 
 
Contributions. 
Overcame the four 
limitations of event studies 
delineated by Chaney, 
Devinney, and Winer 
(1991)       
 
Limitations. 
Attributing the statistically 
significant, positive CAR 
of 0.91% for (+2, +10) to 
some delayed investor 
reaction to the news of a 
change in advertising 
slogan contradicts the 
assumptions of the efficient 
markets hypothesis 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Mathur and 
Mathur (1996) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
173 
announcements 
1989-94 
 
Announcements of new 
advertising agency-client 
relations 
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant 
CAR of 
-0.50% of firms’ 
announcements of new 
advertising accounts 
during  
(-1, 0) 
Contributions. 
 As expected, 
announcements of 
larger new accounts 
fare better than 
announcements of 
smaller new accounts. 
Firms with relatively 
weak financial 
performance for the 
three years prior to the 
announcement do not 
fare well 
       
Limitations. 
Used size and age to 
represent the relative 
prestige of an 
advertising agency 
Limitations. 
The statistically significant 
results for (+1, +5) found 
for announcements of new 
accounts associated with a 
new activity by a firm 
cannot be attributed solely 
to the announcement of a 
new account. Attributing 
new accounts with agency 
linked to the firms’ 
statistically significant, 
positive CAR 1.83% for 
(+6, +10) to investors’ 
positive reassessment (of 
the potential benefits with 
consolidating a new 
account with an existing 
account) subsequent to the 
initial reaction may be 
problematic may be 
problematic because it 
contradicts the assumptions 
of the efficient markets 
hypothesis. 
Hendricks and 
Singhal (1997) 
Management 
Science 
101 firms  
1984-91 
New product introduction 
delay announcements  
• Statistically significant, 
negative CARs of -5.25% 
for (-1, 0) 
Contributions.       
Interestingly, showed 
that firms faced a less 
negative reaction when 
they provided 
estimates of the length 
of the delay 
 
Contributions. 
Found that the greater the 
firm’s diversification, the 
less negative the effect of 
the delay announcement. 
Also tested the statistical 
significance of industry 
competitiveness 
Mathur, Mathur, 
and Rangan 
(1997) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
5 firms  
March 1995 
Announcement of 
Michael Jordan’s return 
to the NBA  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive returns on (0, +1) 
of 1.63% (t=1.82) 
Contributions.  
Demonstrated the 
potential value of 
celebrity endorsements 
 
Limitations. 
Generalizability is 
questionable because 
likely benefits of 
celebrity endorsers are 
overstated by an 
exceptional celebrity 
 
Limitations. 
Although rumors began to 
circulate about Jordan’s 
return on 5/9/95, used 
5/10/95 as day 0 and did 
find statistical significance 
for (-1, 0)      
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Mathur,  Mathur, 
and Gleason 
(1997) 
Journal of 
Services 
Marketing 
80 
announcements 
(19 advertising 
services on the 
internet; 61 
providing 
services on the 
internet) 
1993-96 
Announcements of 
advertising and providing 
services on the Internet 
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CARs of 0.85% 
for (-1, 0) for providing 
services over the Internet 
• Statistically 
insignificant CARs of 
0.45% for Internet 
advertising of services 
Contributions. 
Investors have more 
confidence in firms 
with superior financial 
performance, 
regardless whether 
they are providing 
services over the 
internet or providing 
or advertising services 
on the internet 
 
Contributions. 
Did not include 
announcements in weekly 
trade publications due to 
the ambiguity of the 
announcement date as well 
as the clustering of event 
announcements created by 
using the publication date 
 
Limitations.   
Sample size of 19 for 
advertising services on the 
internet prevented further 
subsample analysis 
Hozier and 
Schatzberg 
(2000) 
Journal of 
Business 
Research  
26 terminations 
(16 actual and 10 
potential) 
1986-94 
Advertising Agency 
Terminations 
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
negative CAR on day -2. 
• Statistically 
insignificant CARs of  
-0.1% for (-1, 0) 
 
Contributions. 
 Found a significant 
decay in firm sales 
growth both before 
and after the 
announcements.  Also 
found deterioration in 
operating income in 
the post-event period 
and a statistically 
significant decline in 
liquidity before the 
event 
Contributions. 
Examined the effect on 
sales, operating income, 
and liquidity as well as 
stock price 
 
Limitations. 
Sample size of 26 
prevented further sub-
sample analysis 
Mathur and 
Mathur (2000) 
Journal of 
Business 
Research  
73 firms 
1989-95 
New “green” product 
announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant CARs for 
announcements related to 
green products, recycling 
efforts, and appointments 
of environmental policy 
managers. 
• Statistically significant 
negative CARs of -0.84% 
for (+1, +5) and  
-3.14% for (-10, +10) for 
announcements for green 
promotional efforts 
Contributions.  
The first study to 
examine the wealth 
effects of green 
marketing activities 
Contributions. 
Examined the stock price 
effect of financial and 
operational characteristics 
(i.e., earnings growth, size, 
advertising-to-sales ratios) 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Cornwell, Pruitt, 
and Van Ness 
(2001) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
 
Indianapolis 500 winning 
and losing drivers  
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant CARs for 
winning and losing 
drivers overall. 
Contributions. 
 Showed that 
sponsorship programs 
can provide value for 
sponsors. Firms 
directly affiliated with 
the consumer 
automotive industry 
fared better than firms 
that were not 
Limitations. 
Uncontrollable, race-
related variables, such as 
winning car's pre-race 
qualification speed and 
whether the winning driver 
was a first-time winner of 
the race, were statistically 
significant 
Mishra and 
Bhabra (2001) 
Journal of 
Product & Brand 
Management 
114 pre-
announcements 
1986-95 
New product 
preannouncements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CARs of 0.77% 
for (-1, 0) (z=2.12) 
Contributions.  
Shows that “relatively 
irreversible” product 
pre-announcements 
(i.e., those containing 
evidence) are valued 
more positively by the 
stock market than 
“reversible” 
announcements that 
lack such evidence, 
which are ignored by 
the stock market 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Miyazaki and 
Morgan (2001) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
27 firms 
 
Olympic Sponsorships 
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive returns of 1.24% 
for (-4, 0) and 0.89% for 
(-3, 0) 
Contributions. 
Refuted the critics of 
Olympic sponsorship 
by showing that it 
provides value to the 
sponsors 
 
Contributions.    
Recognized that the 
information leakage may 
occur through non-print 
media during (-5, -2) 
 
Limitations. 
The small sample size of 
27 limited the statistical 
tests’ power, may have 
resulted in the 
understatement of the 
actual result, and prevented 
the separate analysis of 
first-time sponsors versus 
returning sponsors.  
Did not analyze multiple 
games, which would 
require accounting for  
currency fluctuations, 
changing sponsorship fees, 
and the varying event 
interest due to the choice of 
host country, among other 
factors 
Clark, Cornwell, 
and Pruitt (2002) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
49 
announcements 
by 49 firms 
1985-2000 
Corporate stadium 
sponsorship 
announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CAR of 1.65% 
for (-1, +1). 
• Firm size (negative), 
contract length (positive), 
home team winning 
percentage (positive), and 
a local company dummy 
variable (positive) are 
also statistically 
significant. 
Contributions. 
Countered the 
criticism of stadium 
naming sponsorships 
in the business press. 
Found statistically 
significant, positive 
correlation with 
sponsorship success 
for team’s winning 
percentage, contract 
length, firm type (i.e., 
high technology), and 
headquarters location 
(i.e., locally based) 
Contributions.  
Examined impact of team’s 
winning percentage, 
contract length, firm type 
(i.e., high technology), and 
headquarters location (i.e., 
locally based) 
 
Limitations. 
     Found that sponsorships 
are liable to an 
uncontrollable factor: the 
team’s winning percentage. 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Geyskens, 
Geilens, and 
Dekimpe (2002) 
Journal of 
Marketing 
93 
announcements 
by 22 firms 
1995-2002 
Internet channel addition 
announcements 
• Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CAR of 0.71% 
for (0, +1). 16.38 million 
euros for an average firm 
with a market value of 
2.307 billion euros. 
Contributions. 
Powerful firms with a 
few direct channels 
were found to 
experience greater 
gains in their stock 
price than less 
powerful firms with a 
broader direct channel 
offering. Even after 
controlling for time of 
entry, found that early 
followers enjoy a 
competitive advantage 
over both innovators 
and later followers. 
Also found that 
supporting Internet 
channel additions with 
publicity increases the 
perception of higher 
performance potential 
 
Contributions. 
Identified firm, 
introduction strategy, and 
marketplace characteristics 
that influence the direction 
and magnitude of the stock 
market reaction  
  
Limitations. 
Assumed that stockholders 
are not the only 
stakeholders that matter.  
May have construct 
validity problems because 
of the approximate 
mapping of secondary data 
onto concepts (e.g., 
channel power, quality of a 
firm's relationships with its 
entrenched distributors) 
 
Kim and Morris 
(2003) 
Journal of 
Targeting, 
Measurement & 
Analysis for 
Marketing 
35 firms with 70 
ads 
1998-2000 
Super Bowl 
advertisements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CARs of 0.6% 
for  (t=0) 
 
Contributions. 
Most companies in the 
sample showed 
statistically significant, 
negative abnormal 
returns during the 
testing period. More 
than two-thirds of the 
dot.com advertisers 
noticed a large drop in 
traffic a week after the 
Super Bowl 
  
Contributions.  
Examined the impact on 
web site traffic as well as 
stock price 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Kulkarni, Vora, 
and Brown 
(2003) Journal of 
Advertising 
49 
announcements 
1981-99 
 
Firing advertising 
agencies  
• Stock Price 
• For firms that fired their 
ad agencies, on day -2, 
the abnormal return is -
0.38%. 
• For (-3, -1), the CAR is  
–0.87%  
• For day 0, there is no 
statistically significant 
abnormal return 
• For the ad agencies that 
were fired, the CAR is -
0.84% for day 0 
• For the ad agencies that 
were hired, the CAR is 
3.71% for day 0 
Contributions. 
Found that firms that 
fire their ad agencies 
lost market share in 
the two quarters 
immediately preceding 
the firing. Were the 
first to find that a fall 
in the stock price of 
client firms is 
significantly related to 
the fall in market share 
preceding the firing 
Contributions. 
Included the first 
announcement of the firing 
of an advertising agency 
but excluded 
announcements that were 
preceded by news 
suggesting the possibility 
of the event or the 
announcement that the 
account had been put up 
for review 
Sorescu, Chandy, 
and Prabhu 
(2003) 
Journal of 
Marketing 
255 radical 
innovation 
announcements 
by 66 firms  
1991-2000 
Innovation and New 
Product Development  
• Stock price  
• Announcements by 
dominant firms are 
valued at $456 million, 
whose difference from 
the value of $37 million 
for non-dominant firms is 
statistically significant. 
Contributions. 
Determined which 
firms introduce the 
greatest number of 
radical innovations, 
the magnitude of the 
financial rewards to 
radical innovations, 
and how these rewards 
vary across dominant 
and nondominant 
firms.  
Contributions. 
First researchers to use 
objective measure of 
radical innovation (i.e., 
criteria provided by the 
FDA) as opposed to the 
subjective measure of 
coders 
 
Limitations. 
Using FDA approval date 
as the event date does not 
capture the effect of 
previous announcements 
such as previous successful 
product trials at various 
stages. Dominant 
pharmaceutical firms’ 
advantage may not be 
generalizable.  
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Pruitt, Cornwell, 
and Clark (2004) 
Journal of 
Advertising 
Research 
24 firms 
1995-2001 
NASCAR sponsorship 
announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive CAR of 1.29% 
for all firms during  
(-1, 0).   
• Statistically significant, 
positive CAR of 2.37% 
for (-1, 0) for automotive 
firms during  
(-1, 0). 
Contributions. 
The positive 
correlation concerning 
corporate sponsorships 
and the negative 
correlation regarding 
corporate cash flow 
was an interesting 
finding.  It suggested 
that investors may be 
concerned about the 
financial justifiability 
of highly profitable 
firms’ sponsorships.  
 
Limitations.  
The issue of if 
sponsorships are 
advisable for firms 
whose offerings are 
not easily identified 
with the parent 
corporation was not 
examined.  
Contributions. 
Examined the impact of 
independent variables 
including total corporate 
assets, total cash flow per 
share, the sponsored car’s 
prior year Winston Cup 
points, association with 
consumer automotive 
industry, corporate versus 
subsidiary or product line. 
 
Limitations.  
Did not address the 
statistically insignificant, 
negative post-event drift 
over (+1, +5) that appears 
to wipe out the statistically 
significant, positive effect 
found on during (-1, 0) 
Cornwell, Pruitt, 
and Clark (2005) 
Journal of the 
Academy of 
Marketing 
Science 
53 
announcements 
by 43 firms 
 
Major league sports’ 
official product 
sponsorship 
announcements  
• Stock Price 
• Statistically 
insignificant CAR of 
0.58% for (-1, +1). 
• Statistically significant 
positive CAR of 1.11% 
for (-2, +2) 
• Statistically 
insignificant CAR of 
0.55% for (-5, +5). 
Contributions. 
NBA, NHL, and PGA 
sponsorships and those 
with smaller market 
shares were associated 
with the largest gains 
in share prices. High-
technology companies’ 
sponsorships were 
associated with 
stronger stock price 
reactions. Congruence 
with the sponsored 
sport was positively 
related to firms’ stock 
prices 
Contributions. 
Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark 
(2005) also examined 
corporate cash flow. 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 Independent 
variable(s); Dependent 
variable and findings 
Conceptual 
contributions and 
limitations 
Empirical contributions 
and methodological 
limitations 
Filbeck, Gorman, 
Greenlee, and 
Speh (2005) 
Journal of 
Business 
Logistics 
107 ads  
1995-2000 
Supply chain 
management 
advertisements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically significant 
positive CARs of 0.93% 
for (-1, +1)   
Contributions. 
The greater the 
certainty of the 
distribution date, the 
greater the statistically 
significant, positive 
stock price reaction to 
the announcement 
Contributions. 
Eliminated events with 
important concurrent 
announcements that 
occurred within two days 
of the announcement date 
Tippins and 
Kunkel (2006) 
Journal of 
Marketing  
Communications 
126 firms  
1997-2001 
Clio advertising award 
announcements  
• Stock price 
• Statistically 
insignificant CARs of -
0.5694% for (-3, +3) 
• Statistically significant 
positive CARs of 2.014% 
for food industry 
Contributions.  
Surprisingly, many of 
the results seemingly 
indicated a negative 
effect associated with 
winning a Clio Award, 
which differs from 
other awards in the 
value provided to 
winning firms.  
There may be an 
industry effect within 
the food and kindred 
products segment (i.e. 
CAR of 2.01%), as 
opposed to retailers, 
hard goods 
manufacturers, and 
soft goods 
manufacturers, which 
showed CARS of 
−2.68%,  
-1.85% and −1.97%, 
respectively.  
Suggested that this 
may reflect a market 
bias against perceived 
overspending on 
advertising 
 
Contributions.  
Showed the difficulties 
associated with linking 
financial benefits to 
specific marketing-based 
activities (e.g. advertising) 
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Previous Event Studies of CNCs  
 There have been 13 previous event studies of CNCs that have appeared in the 
marketing, finance, and management literatures and have produced varying results 
ranging from finding no statistically significant share-price reaction associated with a 
CNC (Howe 1982) to finding statistically significant, positive abnormal stock returns as 
high as 53% during the 5 business days  (-2, +2) surrounding the announcements of 
firms adding .com to their corporate names (Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; Lee 2001) 
and up to 12.6% during the 5 business days surrounding the announcement of firms 
deleting .com from their corporate names after February 2000 (Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004).  
The sixteen previous studies relevant to CNCs commenced with Boddewyn’s 
(1966) conceptual study. Of these sixteen studies, eight came from the academic 
discipline of finance, three from marketing, three from management, one from business 
history (Boddewyn 1966), and one from economics (Harawa 1992). The studies 
examined various subsamples of CNCs including the degree of change to the corporate 
name (i.e., major versus minor), the type of firm (i.e., industrial versus consumer), type 
of good (i.e., durable versus nondurable), size of firm, riskiness of firm survival, and 
firm performance, among others. The sample sizes used by the sixteen studies ranged 
from 12 savings and loan institutions (Madura and Tucker 1990) to 250 Internet firms 
(Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004) and the number of years examined by 
these sixteen studies ranged from two years (Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001) to 15 
years (Harawa 1992). 
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Measurement of the financial consequences of CNCs began with Howe’s (1982) 
use of weekly stock price returns over the four weeks preceding and the four weeks 
following the CNC announcement.  Then, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) introduced 
daily stock price returns to this literature stream. These were followed by all subsequent 
CNC event researchers with the exception of Koku (1997), who examined the annual 
price/earnings ratios for the five years preceding and five years following the event. On 
one hand, for the studies utilizing daily stock price returns, the smallest event window 
examined was the event day itself (e.g., Karpoff and Rankine). On the other hand, the 
largest event window was seventeen business days, which were comprised of the 
fourteen business days preceding the event day, and the two business days following the 
event day.  Returns in the study ranged from a daily return of one day, such as the one 
observed by Karpoff and Rankine (1994), to the weekly returns of eight weeks as 
observed by Howe (1992).  
Among the twelve studies using stock price as the dependent variable, seven had 
findings that were statistically significant and positive, five had findings that were 
statistically insignificant, and one (Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004) had a finding 
that was statistically significant and negative. In the thirteenth event study, Koku (1997) 
used the firm’s annual price to earnings ratio as the dependent variable which 
approached statistical significance with a p-value of .0564.  
This section next discusses signaling theory since a majority of these event 
studies rely upon it to explain the stock price effects of CNCs. Then, the thirteen 
previous event studies are reviewed in chronological order and their individual 
   24
contributions to the study of CNCs are addressed. Finally, their limitations are 
summarized as part of a critical analysis of the studies as a whole. 
Signaling theory. Signaling theory has been characterized as “a unique 
communication theory whose application is necessitated by information asymmetry 
between a firm and its stakeholders” (Koku 1997: 396). Signaling theory is distinct from 
other communication theories in that it incorporates signals (i.e., symbols or variables) 
that cannot be easily mimicked by competitors who may not have anything important 
about their firm to signal.  Moreover these signals are understood by both the sender 
(e.g. the firm) as well as the target audience (e.g., consumers and investors). Introduced 
to the economics literature by Spence (1973), signaling theory has been used by several 
researchers in economics to explain information asymmetry (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979; 
Leland and Pyle 1977; Myers 1977; Ross 1979; Spence 1973). For instance, Spence 
(1973) contended that it is possible for agents, such as managers, to signal their true 
quality through the quality of their higher education. Expanded by Leland and Pyle 
(1977), Myers (1977), and Bhattacharya (1979), signaling theory contends that economic 
information that is uniquely known by management will be conveyed to the shareholders 
through various signals.  
 Several event studies in marketing (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Bobinski and 
Ramirez 1994; Lane and Jacobson 1995; Mathur and Mathur 1995; Mathur and Mathur 
1996; Mishra and Bhabra 2001; Miyazaki and Morgan 2001) utilized a market signaling 
perspective to explain the effects of their independent variables on firms’ stock prices. 
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Bobinski and Ramirez (1994) acknowledged that the financial information 
disclosed in advertisements to investors may be neither new nor relevant to the market as 
a whole, but may still signal information to some marketplace participants. In fact, Ross 
(1977) contended that all communication related to investor relations has some signaling 
content. On one hand, an advertisement may be perceived as a positive signal by some 
investors if it indicates that the company is aggressively doing business and enhancing 
its reputation (Bobinski and Ramirez 1994; Garbett 1981). On the other hand, an 
advertisement may be perceived as a negative signal by institutional investors, large 
scale investors, fund money managers, or active investors who view it as an unnecessary 
expenditure that will have little effect on the market’s perception of the firm (Bobinski 
and Ramirez 1994; Garbett 1988). 
Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) acknowledged that a celebrity endorsement 
contract might signal information to investors that does not directly pertain to the 
celebrity’s effectiveness as an endorser of its products (Klein and Leffler 1981; Nelson 
1974). For example, the announcement may signal the confidence a firm has in the 
superiority of its products or of its commitment to particular brands.  
Lane and Jacobson (1995) utilized a marketing signaling perspective while 
examining the effect of a brand extension on a firm’s stock price. Asserting that firms 
interact with the market through mutual signaling and monitoring, Lane and Jacobson 
(1995) assumed that the various reports and announcements made by firms represent 
actual information about the firms’ status. Although somewhat obvious, that observation 
is nonetheless very important.  If that is indeed the way a firm communicates with its 
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stakeholders, then, according to Lane and Jacobson (1995), changes in stock price serve 
as a means through which stakeholders can communicate back to the firm since they 
denote the level of performance expected by shareholders seeking to earn their desired 
rate of return. In other words, it allows the firm to gauge how much their firm is worth to 
their stakeholders. This modifies the more common perspective of market signaling, in 
which it is the firms that do the signaling. In this perspective, investors send signals of 
their own back to the firm, which provides “an immediate way to score the game” 
(Jacobson and Lane 1995: 63). 
Mathur and Mathur (1995) described the effects of changes in advertising 
slogans as market signals from management regarding their intent to improve the firm’s 
future earnings. Hence, Mathur and Mathur (1995) asserted that these slogan changes are 
a way for management to make a firm’s initiative public without formally 
communicating the change in direction by means of a press release. They also claimed 
that slogan changes can also signal increases in future earnings. In addition, Mathur and 
Mathur (1996) argued that managers may communicate new information such as the 
announcement of new advertising agency-client relations to investors in order to signal 
important changes in the firm’s strategy.  
Mishra and Bhabra (2001) examined how the market filters actual signals from 
“bluffs.” One method a bluff might take is the form of a preannouncement of a new 
product that is never launched. On the other hand, an example of an actual signal is 
Microsoft’s preannouncement of a new product well before it will be released in order to 
dissuade consumers from buying existing products from their competitors. As a result, 
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Mishra and Bhabra (2001) concluded that signals sent by firms are not always useful or 
credible and the market is likely to ignore a firm’s announcement if it deems it not to be 
a solid and deliberate signal. In addition, Miyazaki and Morgan’s (2001) study of 
corporate sponsorships of the Olympic Games asserted that Olympic events, sites, and 
even Olympians themselves are shown to serve as signals to the market constituents of a 
firm.  
Use of a market signaling perspective is particularly common among CNC event 
studies. In fact, eleven of the thirteen CNC event studies (Bosch and Hirschey 1989; 
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004; Ferris 
1988; Harawa 1992; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 
2004; Koku 1997; Lee 2001; Madura and Tucker 1990; Morris and Reyes 1991) utilized 
a market signaling perspective to explain the stock price effect of CNCs.  
The signaling literature indicates that a signal must meet two tests to be credible. 
First, in order to be credible, the signal must have a high cost for the sender (Spence 
1973). Second, the signal must be more costly to firms that simply change their name for 
‘cosmetic’ purposes without any announcement of strategies to improve quality than for 
firms that change their name due to a focus on new business strategy or efforts to 
mitigate financial distress (Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004; Koku 1997).   
 Horsky and Swyngedouw’s (1987) widely cited article was the first to address 
CNCs in marketing and introduced the event study methodology to the marketing 
literature. By testing two competing sets of seven hypotheses, Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) compared the signaling perspective competing to the perspective that CNCs are 
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“utility producing” because they alter the demand for a firm’s products or services. Their 
first hypothesis argued that, on one hand, if a CNC is utility-producing, then the greater 
the change to the firm’s corporate name during a CNC, the greater the CNC’s positive 
impact on its stock price. On the other hand, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) argued 
that the CNC is merely a signal, and it should make no difference whether the change to 
the corporate name was major or minor. In fact, a major change to the corporate name 
may necessitate larger advertising outlays to get established, and thus may in fact be 
associated with smaller returns. As a result, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) argued that 
the statistically insignificant differences that they found between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name supported their signaling perspective. 
Second, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) stated that if CNCs are utility-
producing, then the impact of a CNC will be larger for a consumer firm than an 
industrial firm.  This is because the new name should have a significant effect on 
consumers’ perceptions of the firms’ products and image, which is supposed to have a 
more significant impact on demand for consumer goods than for industrial goods.  
Third, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) asserted that if CNCs are utility-
producing, then the impact of a CNC will be larger for a firm producing durable goods 
than a firm producing nondurable goods.  This is because durable goods manufacturers 
often use the company name as the brand name for all of their product lines. Thus, if the 
new name causes a real shift in demand, then it is likely to have a greater effect on 
durable goods. However, if the CNC is only a signal, then no clear difference should 
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exist between a CNC by a durable goods manufacturer and a CNC by a manufacturer of 
purchased goods.  
 Fourth, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) contended that a financial institution 
undergoing a utility-producing CNC would have a greater chance of having higher 
discounted earnings in the future than nonfinancial institutions. This is because most 
financial institutions, such as investment houses, accumulate money with promises to 
return it. Therefore, the corporate name conveys a signal of fidelity and trust. 
Consequently, if the CNC shifts the demand curve, the importance of the corporate name 
will have a greater impact on a financial institution. However, if the CNC is only being 
used as a signal, this conclusion may prove to be contradictory. If the CNC is being 
displayed as a signal, investors may perceive this is as some sort of augmented risk, and 
take their money elsewhere.  
 Fifth, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) argued that if the CNC is utility-
producing, firms of smaller size will benefit less from a CNC than larger, more 
established firms. This is due to the fact that a portion of name change costs are fixed 
costs, such as market research, and thus it would be relatively less costly for a larger 
firm to undergo a CNC than a smaller firm. Another potential benefit to the larger firm is 
the publicity that is generated from a CNC. If, however, the CNC is serving as a signal 
that there will be further attempts, such as organizational changes, to increase the value 
of the firm; then this can cause the market to believe that these other changes will be 
better carried out by smaller firms rather than larger because smaller firms have a greater 
simplicity of transition than larger ones.  
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 Horsky and Swyngedouw’s (1987) sixth hypothesis posited that a firm which is a 
riskier investment, as evidenced by greater fluctuation in its stock price, will experience 
a greater impact of return from a CNC if it can reduce the perception of the firm’s 
riskiness. For a risky firm, a new name is likely to be followed by a larger shift in 
demand because of uncertain sales revenues as compared to a stable firm. In this 
instance, a new name, whether a signal that future changes are near or simply as a 
demand shifting result, produces the larger shift for a riskier firm.  
 Seventh, a CNC will have a far greater impact on a firm whose performance has 
been poor prior to the name change. Firms with inferior performance compared to the 
market or competition for a certain period of time prior to the CNC can improve their 
performance and recapture some of their lost market share if the new name has real 
value. Hence, if a poorly performing firm changes its name, it signals some operational 
or strategic changes that can only improve the firm’s current situation.  
Ferris (1988) stated that CNCs will be conveyed by a firm’s management as a 
signal in response to the problem of asymmetric information. According to Ferris 
(1988), CNCs serve to signal a variety of information to potential shareholders in the 
capital market and the firm’s existing shareholders. CNCs may also serve to alert the 
market about a change in geographic distribution of a firm’s product, in organizational 
structure, or in a restructuring of the firm’s assets. 
Bosch and Hirschey (1989) also asserted that a CNC is used as a signal, arguing 
that a CNC is most often used in creating a new corporate image. Bosch and Hirschey 
(1989) also stated that CNCs reflect changes in the firm’s product lines, prevent 
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confusion with other companies, reflect a restructuring of the firm, convey that the firm 
has diversified, or bring greater focus to certain aspects of the firm’s business.  
Koku (1997) also adopted a market signaling perspective and concluded that 
service companies can improve their price-earning ratios when they utilize a CNC to 
signal to customers, competitors, and investors its intentions to become more 
competitive or to signal a new way of doing business. For instance, Koku (1997) argued 
that the information asymmetry in a CNC allows a firm to surprise its competitors with 
new products or services. Furthermore, Koku (1997) stated that firms often use different 
financial and marketing variables to communicate their superior quality of their products 
or soundness of their financial position.  
Lee (2001) adopted a market signaling perspective and distinguished between 
cosmetic (i.e., image only) and versus strategic CNCs that were coupled other changes 
within the company. Lee (2001) discussed how a CNC can resolve a discrepancy 
between organizational image and identity, if one exists, and the reactions of investors 
can be gauged to see how they judge the actions taken by management. Lee (2001) also 
explained how the signaling perspective enlightens the strength of signals from firms 
that also announce strategies which are consistent with the CNC and that these signals 
should be reflected in the magnitude of change in the stock price and trading volume. 
Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad (2004) examined CNCs by firms protected under 
the Malaysian Companies Act of 1965 that received approval from the regulatory 
authorities to undertake a restructuring scheme to revive their financial condition. They 
asserted that information asymmetry can make it very difficult for investors to 
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distinguish “high-quality” firms that change their names to signal that they are truly 
taking steps to improve their outlook from “low-quality” firms that simply change their 
name for “cosmetic” purposes without any announcement of strategies to improve the 
firm’s condition. 
Other researchers, however, have argued against the signaling perspective. For 
instance, Howe (1982) examined whether a CNC served as an effective managerial 
signal of other changes in the firm’s characteristics. Upon finding a statistically 
insignificant stock price effect associated with CNCs, Howe (1982) concluded that a 
CNC was not an effective signal of other changes in the firm and that managers need not 
worry about keeping the firm’s name “up to date.” In addition, Karpoff and Rankine 
(1994) concluded that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that a CNC 
conveys information about the performance of a firm and its business lines. Karpoff and 
Rankine (1994) also found no evidence that consumers view a firm as operating in a 
different line of business after a CNC has taken place.  
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In summary, the preponderance of evidence from the sixteen previous studies of 
CNCs summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 indicates that a CNC does indeed signal other 
changes taking place within the firm. What remains to be determined, however, is 
whether, as Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) posited, the effect of a CNC is restricted to 
the effect of these other organizational changes or whether the CNC itself can also affect 
the demand for a firm’s products and services. For example, Horsky and Swyngedouw’s 
(1987) conclusion that a CNC is merely a signal relies upon their finding that it makes 
no difference whether the change to the corporate name was major or minor. However, 
as Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) themselves conceded, if a CNC is utility-producing, 
then the greater the change to the firm’s corporate name during a CNC, the greater the 
CNC’s positive impact on its stock price. As the hypotheses and results illustrate, this 
dissertation maintains that, in contrast to the conclusion of Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) a CNC can indeed impact the demand for a firm’s goods and services. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ON CORPORATE NAME 
CHANGES 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Boddewyn 
(1966) 
Business 
History 
Review 
Conceptual 
 
• Change in corporate entity 
(mergers, change in ownership) 
• Shorter names in advertising 
copy 
• Diversification 
• Industry affiliation 
(technological change) 
• Geographic affiliation 
• International expansion 
• Brand affiliation 
• New image (symbolize growth, 
energy, or aggressiveness) 
• Confusion with other names 
  
Howe (1982) 
Financial 
Review 
Event Study 
(-4, +4 
weeks) 
121 firms 
1962-80 
• New corporate entity (1981 – 
acquisitions, 33%, mergers, 
16%, spinoffs 11%, 
reorganizations 5%) 
• Diversification (activities and 
products) 
• New image (shed stodgy 
image) 
• New image 
(shed stodgy 
image) 
Stock price 
• 0.07% 
 
Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 
(1987) 
Marketing 
Science 
Event Study 
(-1, 0) 
58 firms 
1981-85  
• Change in corporate entity 
(better describe new combined 
business) 
• Change in corporate image 
(acquire new image and 
corporate identity) 
• Degree of 
change (radical 
versus cosmetic)  
• Type of firm 
(industrial goods 
vs. consumer 
goods)  
• Type of good 
(durable vs. non-
durable) 
• Industry 
affiliation 
(financial 
institutions)  
• Size of firm  
• Riskiness of 
firm survival 
• Firm 
performance 
Stock Price 
• Statistically significant 
positive overall effect 
(0.61%, t=2.15, p<.02) 
• no greater effect for radical 
change (-0.26%, t=1.11) 
• greater effect for industrial 
(1.24%, t=3.02 versus 0.45%, 
t=1.65)  
• no greater effect for durable 
(-0.04%, t=0.18) 
• financial service hurts name 
change (-1.33%, t=2.95) 
• no greater effect for larger 
firm (0.02%, t=0.77) 
• greater effect for riskier 
firm (0.45%, t=2.04) 
• greater effect for poorly 
performing firm (-0.39%, 
t=1.46) 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Ferris (1988) 
1983-1985 
Journal of 
Applied 
Business 
Research  
Event Study 
(-2, +2) 
• New corporate entity (new 
investment policy and schedule, 
change in organization structure, 
divestiture 
• Diversification (intent to re-
structure assets) 
•Association or 
co-announcement 
with changes in 
economic or 
managerial 
activities  
• Character length 
(shorten or 
lengthen) 
• Change to 
coined name 
• Change to high 
tech sounding 
name (onics, ex, 
ix) 
• Geographical 
expansion 
• New market 
penetration 
Stock Price and EPS 
• Statistically insignificant 
stock price effects for all 
types 
• Statistically significant, 
positive EPS effects for 
changes to high tech name 
(8.912%) 
Bosch and 
Hirschey 
(1989) 
Financial 
Management  
Event Study 
 (-10, 0) 
(-4, +5) 
(0, +1) 
(+1, +10) 
(-10, +10) 
79 firms 
1979-86 
• Change in corporate entity 
(mergers, acquisitions, 
divestitures, restructuring) 
• Change in corporate image  
• Brand affiliation 
• Reflect changes in product 
lines 
• Confusion with other 
companies 
• Diversification  
• Adopt acronym 
• Degree of 
change (major vs. 
minor) 
Minor better than 
major 
• Existence of 
previous corporate 
restructuring 
Stock Price 
• Modest and transitory  
•  Minor CNCs have a 
statistically significant, 
positive effect on a daily 
basis (1.25%, t=2.88, p<.01 
on day -5; 0.75%, t=1.74, 
p<.1 on day 0); positive 
(2.15%) over the pre-
announcement period (-10, 
0), but have a statistically 
insignificant effect on a 
cumulative basis; statistically 
significant, negative effect       
(-2.71%, t=-1.98, p<.05) on a 
cumulative basis over the 
post announcement period 
(+1, +10) 
• Major CNCs have 
statistically insignificant 
effects on either a daily or a 
cumulative basis 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Madura and 
Tucker 
(1990) 
Review of 
Business and 
Economic 
Research  
Event Study 
(-6, +5) 
12 firms 
1987-89 
• Diversification of mortgage 
lenders 
• Decrease affiliation with 
industry  
(savings and loan) 
• Decrease affiliation with 
geographic region 
• Confusion with competitors 
• Decrease 
affiliation with 
industry (savings 
and loan) 
  
Stock Price 
• No statistically significant 
impact overall 
• Largest reaction for the 
portfolio occurs 3 days 
before the announcement 
(2.189%, t=1.758, p<.05) 
• Followed by CAR of  
-0.442% on (-3, +1)  
Morris and 
Reyes (1991) 
Journal of 
Applied 
Business 
Research  
Event Study 
(-14, +2) 
28 firms 
1979-85 
• Change in corporate entity 
(megamergers, unfriendly 
takeovers, leveraged buyouts, 
restructuring) 
• Diversification 
• Change in corporate image 
(changes in communication 
efforts) 
• International expansion (e.g., 
prevent unattractive phonetic 
sound or spelling in international 
markets) 
• Industry affiliation (e.g., 
fluorocarbons) 
• Distinctiveness 
• Relevance 
• Memorability 
• Flexibility 
• Positive nature 
Stock Price 
• New corporate names 
possessing more of the five 
functional characteristics 
(distinctiveness, relevance, 
flexibility, memorability, 
positive nature) have higher 
abnormal stock returns 
(5.817%) over (-14, +2) than 
those with fewer of the 
functional characteristics  
(-4.236%) (t=-7.7288, 
p<.0001) 
Harawa 
(1992) 
Unpublished 
dissertation 
Event Study 
(-1, +1) 
160 firms 
1970-84 
• Respond to internal and 
external business factors by:  
- Adopting memorable, unique 
and strong corporate names 
- Decreasing industry affiliation  
- Indicating modernization or 
new product directions 
- Removing outdated image 
- Decreasing affiliation with a 
geographic region 
- Breaking with its past 
• Respond to CNC fads by:  
- Adopting acronym 
- Changing to high tech sounding 
name  
  (e.g., tronics) 
- Increasing environmental 
friendliness of corporate name  
- Affiliating with performance 
- Affiliating with the future by 
using certain letters (e.g., x, z) 
• CNCs ranked by 
their degree of 
pre-announcement 
(i.e., 48 months 
before) and post-
announcement 
(i.e., 48 months 
after) response to 
CNC 
announcements. 
Stock Price 
• Found statistically 
significant, positive stock 
price effects for day -1 of 
0.7% (z=2.3364), but 
statistically insignificant 
effects for (0, +1) of -0.152% 
for (0, +1). 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Karpoff and 
Rankine 
(1994) 
Journal of 
Banking and 
Finance  
Event Study 
(-1, 0) 
123 firms 
1979-87 
• Increase affiliation with 
product line 
• Adopt acronym 
• Change from acronym 
 Stock Price 
•  1.56% (z=2.76) for  
(-1, 0) for 36 firms without 
prior mention in a proxy 
statement and without a 
concurrent announcement 
(t=2.07, p<.05) 
•  0.01% (z=0.56) for  
(-1, 0) for 88 firms 
(including 1 firm that made a 
contemporaneous 
announcement) by firms that 
had previously mentioned 
the CNC in an SEC proxy 
statement. •      
Kohli and 
Hemnes 
(1995) 
Business 
Horizons  
Conceptual 
 
• Simplification 
• Industry affiliation 
• Geographical affiliation 
• Length 
• Distinctiveness 
 
Koku (1997) 
The Journal 
of Services 
Marketing  
Event Study 
(-5, +5 years) 
22 firms 
1980-90 
• Change in corporate entity 
(mergers, acquisitions) 
• Industry affiliation (better 
reflect new business it has 
entered) 
• Intention to become more 
competitive or signal a new way 
of doing business 
 P/E ratio 
• Statistically significant, 
positive difference between 
the post-event and pre-event 
means of the P/E ratios 
(t=2.28, p<.05) 
Glynn and 
Abzug (2002) 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
Conceptual 
• Industry affiliation • Name’s length 
and ambiguity 
• Name’s 
ambiguity 
• Name’s domain 
specificity 
• Audience 
orientation 
• Understand-
ability 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Cooper, 
Dimitrov and 
Rau (2001) 
Journal of 
Finance  
Event Study 
(0, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
95 firms 
1998-99 
• Industry affiliation (.com) • Change to .com Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive abnormal returns of 
53% for the five business 
days around the 
announcement date 
Lee (2001) 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal  
Event Study 
(-2, -1) 
(-1, 0) 
(0, +1) 
(-1, +1) 
114 firms 
1995-99 
• Industry affiliation (.com)  • Industry 
affiliation (.com) 
• Cosmetic vs. 
strategic 
Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive abnormal returns of 
2.70% (p<.001) over (-1, +1) 
Cooper, 
Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel 
and Rau 
(2004) 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance  
Event Study 
(-15, -2) 
(0, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(+2, +15) 
(+1, +30) 
(-30, +30) 
250 firms 
1998-2001 
• Industry affiliation (.com) 
 
• Deletion of .com Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
positive abnormal returns of 
10.6% (t=2.58) over  
(0, +1) and of 53% (t=2.32) 
over (-30, +30) 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
 Antecedents of CNCs 
Identified 
Types of CNCs 
Studied 
Dependent Variable and 
Major Findings 
Karbhari, 
Sori and 
Mohamad 
(2004) 
Corporate 
Ownership 
and Control  
Event Study 
 (-11, +10) 
(-10, 0) 
(+1, +10) 
(-10, +10) 
18 firms 
1984-96 
 
• Change in corporate entity 
(merger, divestiture)  
• Confusion with another firm 
• Adopt acronym 
• Change in corporate image 
• Diversification 
• Failed vs. non-
failed firms 
Stock Price 
• Statistically significant, 
negative abnormal returns of  
-8% (t=-2.57) over  
(-10, +10) for non-failed 
firms 
• Statistically insignificant, 
positive returns for failed 
firms  
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TABLE 3 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF EVENT STUDIES OF 
CORPORATE NAME CHANGES 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Howe (1982) 
Financial 
Review 
Event Study 
121 firms 
1962-80 
Contributions. 
Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• New corporate entity (1981 – acquisitions, 33%, 
mergers, 16%, spinoffs 11%, reorganizations 5%) 
• Diversification 
(activities and products) 
• New image (shed stodgy image) 
     Differentiated changes in corporate image from 
changes in corporate entity 
     
Limitations 
Failed to differentiate between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name or brand name 
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
Contributions. 
First empirical study of CNCs. 
Examined two event dates: 1) 
date the CNC is first announced 
in the Wall Street Journal; and 
2) date of the meeting at which 
shareholders approve the CNC 
(Note: Attempted to confirm the 
event dates with all firms listed 
in the sample with a survey, 
which received 52 partial or 
complete responses from the 
121 firms.  Because of the 
incomplete response and 
incomplete coverage by the 
Wall Street Journal, both dates 
are not available for all 
companies.) 
Examined differences between 
NYSE and ASE. 
Examined differences and 
between 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Limitations. 
Examined weekly returns 
instead of daily returns 
          Using the date of 
announcement in Wall Street 
Journal instead of the press 
release date may have been 
appropriate in 1982, but using 
the date of the meeting rather 
than the date the results of the 
meeting were announced seems 
inappropriate. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 
(1987) 
Marketing 
Science 
Event Study 
58 firms 
1981-85  
Contributions. 
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Change in corporate entity (better describe new 
combined business) 
• Change in corporate image (acquire new image 
and corporate identity) 
     Successfully supported the signaling 
hypothesis. 
     Partially recognized distinction between 
changes in corporate image from changes in 
corporate entity by excluding CNC from the 
sample that made concurrent announcement on the 
event day, resulting in a partially correct 
classification of changes in corporate entity. 
     Unlike Howe (1982), found a statistically 
significant, positive overall effect (0.61%, t=2.15, 
p<.02). 
     Recognized distinction between major and 
minor changes to the corporate name. 
     Partially recognized the effect of affiliating with 
an industry (i.e., financial services) and found that     
being a financial service hurts CNC (-1.33%, 
t=2.95). 
      Recognized distinction between industrial and 
consumer firms and found a greater effect for 
industrial (1.24%, t=3.02 versus 0.45%, t=1.65) for 
the 39 industrial firms (80% of 49) in the sample. 
      Recognized distinction between risky and non-
risky firms and found greater effect for riskier firm 
(0.45%, t=2.04). 
      Recognized distinction between well and 
poorly performing firms and found a greater effect 
for poorly performing firm     (-0.39%, t=1.46). 
     Recognized distinction between well and poorly 
performing firms and found greater effect for 
poorly performing firm (-0.39%, t=1.46). 
     
Limitations. 
Failed to differentiate between brand name altering 
and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
     Argued that CNCs must be accompanied by 
other changes in the firm and signal “good” 
information.  While this may be true for minor 
name changes, this need not be true for names that 
undergo a major change to better reflect what a 
company is already doing (e.g., Peat Marwick to 
BearingPoint) 
Contributions. 
Introduced the event study 
methodology to the marketing 
literature. 
     Excluded regulated firms 
such as public utilities since a 
CNC cannot signal a change in 
their level of service and rates, 
which are largely determined by 
a regulatory body. In addition, 
Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) persuasively argued that 
the primary demand for 
electricity is not likely to be 
affected by the change in a 
utility company’s name.  
     Tested several independent 
variables including degree of 
change to the corporate name 
(major versus minor), industry 
effects (financial services versus 
non-financial services), type of 
firm (industrial versus 
consumer), riskiness (i.e., the 
magnitude of covariance of the 
firm’s stock return with that of 
the market), and performance 
(well versus poor). 
 
Limitations. 
Insufficient sample size may 
have prevented examination of 
brand name altering versus non-
brand name altering CNCs, 
major versus minor changes to 
the corporate name, and CNCs 
related to a change in corporate 
image versus a change in 
corporate entity. 
     Failed to correctly classify 
all of the firms who had 
undergone a change in 
corporate entity within a year of 
the CNC announcement.    
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Ferris (1988) 
Journal of 
Applied 
Business 
Research  
Event Study 
1983-85 
Contributions. 
Found that CNCs can serve as signals of enhanced 
investment opportunities or of 
economic/managerial activities (e.g., asset 
divestment, divisional restructuring) that will 
positively influence anticipated earnings.       
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• New corporate entity (new investment policy and 
schedule, change in organization structure, 
divestiture 
• Diversification (intent to re-structure assets) 
     Recognized distinctions among: 
•Association or co-announcement with changes in 
economic or managerial activities  
• Character length (shorten or lengthen) 
• Change to coined name 
• Change to high tech sounding name (onics, ex, 
ix) 
• Geographical expansion 
• New market penetration 
    For changes to high tech name, found positive 
stock price effects that approached statistical 
significance (1.837%, t=1.884, p<.10) for day 0, 
but statistically insignificant effects for (-2, +2). 
     For changes to high tech name that had a 
subsequent increase in EPS, found statistically 
significant, positive stock price effects of 8.912%  
(t=2.837, p<.05) for  
(-2, +2). 
     For changes to high tech name that had a 
subsequent decrease in EPS, found statistically 
significant, positive stock price effects of -5.76%  
(t=-2.489, p<.05) for  
(-2, +2). 
 
Limitations.  
Failed to differentiate between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name or brand name 
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
 
Contributions. 
Tested the effect on earnings 
per share as well as stock price. 
      Tested distinctions among: 
•Association or co-
announcement with changes in 
economic or managerial 
activities  
• Character length (shorten or 
lengthen) 
• Change to coined name 
• Change to high tech sounding 
name (onics, ex, ix) 
• Geographical expansion 
• New market penetration 
• First, second, or most recent 
CNC. 
 
Limitations. 
Rather than using the date of 
first publicly available 
announcement of the CNC, used 
the Wall Street Journal 
publication date as day 0. 
     Permitted CNC 
announcements contaminated 
by concurrent announcements 
(e.g., asset divestment, 
divisional restructuring) to 
remain in sample in order to 
conclude that CNCs can serve 
as signals of enhanced 
investment opportunities or of 
economic/managerial activities 
that will positively influence 
anticipated earnings.          
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Bosch and 
Hirschey 
(1989) 
Financial 
Management  
Event Study 
79 firms 
1979-86 
Correctly classified CNCs by firms with a previous 
corporate restructuring as CNCs related to a 
change in corporate entity. 
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Change in corporate entity (mergers, 
acquisitions, divestitures, restructuring) 
• Change in corporate image  
• Brand affiliation 
• Reflect changes in product lines 
• Confusion with other companies 
• Diversification  
• Adopt acronym 
      Measured degree of change to the corporate 
name and found that minor CNCs (1.25%, t=2.88, 
p<.01 on day -5; 0.75%, t=1.74, p<.1 on day 0) 
outperformed major changes (whose difference 
from zero is not statistically significant on a daily 
or a cumulative basis). 
 
Limitations 
Failed to differentiate between brand name altering 
and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
     
Limitations. 
Sample size of 79 may have 
prevented measurement of a 
major change to the corporate 
name related to a change in 
corporate image. 
     
Madura and 
Tucker (1990) 
Review of 
Business and 
Economic 
Research  
Event Study 
12 firms 
1987-89 
Contributions. 
Correctly classified CNCs by firms with a previous 
merger as CNCs related to a change in corporate 
entity. 
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Diversification of mortgage lenders 
• Decrease affiliation with industry (savings and 
loan) 
• Decrease affiliation with geographic region 
• Confusion with competitors 
 
Limitations. 
Did not verify the impact of a CNC related to a 
change in corporate entity. Failed to differentiate 
between major / minor changes to the corporate 
name or brand name altering / non-brand name 
altering CNCs.  
Limitations. 
Sample size of 12 prevented 
further subsample analysis. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Morris and 
Reyes (1991) 
Journal of 
Applied 
Business 
Research  
Event Study 
28 firms 
1979-85 
Contributions. 
Found that new corporate names possessing more 
of the five functional characteristics 
(distinctiveness, relevance, flexibility, 
memorability, positive nature) have higher 
abnormal stock returns (5.817%) over (-14, +2) 
than those with fewer of the functional 
characteristics  
(-4.236%) (t=-7.7288, p<.0001) 
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Change in corporate entity (megamergers, 
unfriendly takeovers, leveraged buyouts, 
restructuring) 
• Diversification 
• Change in corporate image (changes in 
communication efforts) 
• International expansion (e.g. prevent unattractive 
phonetic sound or spelling in international 
markets) 
• Industry affiliation (e.g. fluorocarbons) 
      
Limitations. 
Failed to differentiate between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name or brand name 
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
 
 
 
Contributions. 
Tested the distinctiveness, 
relevance, memorability, 
flexibility, and positive nature 
of corporate names. 
 
Limitations. 
Methodological weakness of 
measuring key characteristics of 
corporate names (i.e., 
distinctiveness, relevance, 
flexibility, memorability, and 
positive nature) without 
providing any information about 
the company. 
    By scoring a corporate name 
judged as having all five 
characteristics as a 5 as opposed 
to a 1 for a corporate name 
having only one of the 
characteristics, ignored the 
relative importance of a 
particular characteristic for a 
new corporate name (e.g., 
relevance for a new corporate 
name increasing its affiliation 
with an industry). 
    Chose to restrict the sample 
size to 28 in order to minimize 
the amount of respondent 
fatigue evaluating the CNCs. 
Prevented further subsample 
analysis. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 
 
Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Harawa 
(1992) 
Unpublished 
dissertation 
Event Study 
160 firms 
1970-84 
 
 
 
Limitations. 
Defined day 0 as the day the 
announcement appeared in the 
Wall Street Journal rather than 
the press release date, which 
usually precedes the 
announcement in the Wall 
Street Journal. 
This presented two problems: 1) 
It may explain why Harawa 
found statistically significant, 
positive stock price effects for 
day -1 of 0.7% (z=2.3364), but 
statistically insignificant effects 
of -0.152% for (0, +1); and 2) it 
failed to capture any 
information leakage prior to the 
press release date. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Karpoff and 
Rankine 
(1994) 
Journal of 
Banking and 
Finance  
Event Study 
147 firms 
1979-87 
Contributions. 
Cast doubt on previous researchers’ conclusions 
that CNCs convey information about changes in 
the firm’s line of business or that they signal 
management’s private information about the firm’s 
performance. 
     Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Increase affiliation with product line 
• Adopt acronym 
• Change from acronym 
Tested the stock price effects of 36 CNC 
announcements that did not include a 
contemporaneous announcement by firms that had 
not previously mentioned the CNC in an SEC 
proxy statement. For these 36 firms, found 
statistically significant, positive stock price effects 
of 1.56% (z=2.76) for (-1, 0).  
      Also tested the stock price effects of 88 CNC 
announcements (including 1 firm that made a 
contemporaneous announcement) by firms that had 
previously mentioned the CNC in an SEC proxy 
statement. For these 88 firms, however, found 
statistically insignificant stock price effects of 
0.01% (z=0.56) for (-1, 0).   
 
Limitations. 
Failed to differentiate between CNCs related to 
changes in corporate image and changes in 
corporate entity, major and minor changes to the 
corporate name or brand name altering and non-
brand name altering CNCs. 
 
Contributions. 
Tested for outliers and found 
them to have a statistically 
significant impact on the results. 
 
Limitations. 
Only included events covered in 
the Wall Street Journal to focus 
on announcement days that 
received widespread publicity. 
This seems overly restrictive 
since one can assume that 
analysts following a firm will 
also be aware of and react to 
press releases announcing 
CNCs regardless of whether 
they are published by the Wall 
Street Journal. Moreover, it 
restricted the overall sample 
(including those with a 
contemporaneous 
announcement) to 147 firms and 
severely limited the power of 
the further subsample analysis 
(e.g., only 36 announcements 
with neither a prior mention in 
an SEC proxy statement nor a 
contemporaneous 
announcement). 
       Using the SEC proxy date 
seems like it might not always 
reflect publicly available 
information.  
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Koku (1997) 
The Journal 
of Services 
Marketing  
Event Study 
22 firms 
1980-90 
Contributions. 
Only researcher to differentiate service firms from 
non-service firms. 
   Identified the following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Change in corporate entity (mergers, 
acquisitions) 
• Industry affiliation (better reflect new business it 
has entered) 
• Intention to become more competitive or signal a 
new way of doing business 
     Found P/E ratio effects: 
• Statistically significant, positive difference 
between the post-event and pre-event means of the 
P/E ratios (t=2.28, p<.05) 
 
Limitations. 
Failure to differentiate between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name or brand name-
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs.  
Contributions. 
Used the trend analysis method 
in order to examine the P/E 
ratios of firms which have 
multiple events occurring 
concurrently for the five years 
before and after the CNC. 
 
Limitations. 
Did not eliminate firms with 
concurrent announcements from 
the sample     
      Only 4 of the 28 firms in the 
sample released no other 
information within a week of 
the CNC. 
 
Cooper, 
Dimitrov, and 
Rau (2001) 
Journal of 
Finance  
Event Study 
95 firms 
1998-99 
 
Contributions. 
Found a statistically significant. positive abnormal 
return of 53% for the five business days around the 
announcement date of a .com CNC with no post-
event negative drift. 
 
Limitations. 
Failure to differentiate between major and minor 
changes to the corporate name or brand name-
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
 
Limitations. 
Failed to correctly classify all of 
the firms who had undergone a 
change in corporate entity 
within a year of the CNC 
announcement. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Lee (2001) 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal  
Event Study 
114 firms 
1995-99 
Contributions. 
Found a statistically significant, positive abnormal 
returns of 2.70% (p<.001) over   
(-1, +1) for.com CNCs. 
     Distinguished between cosmetic versus strategic 
CNCs. 
     Successfully supported the market signaling 
perspective. 
 
Limitations. 
Failure to differentiate between CNCs related to a 
change in corporate image and a change in 
corporate entity.  For example one CNC 
announcement classified as strategic CNC 
(Bridgeport Communications to 
WealthHound.com) was the result of an acquisition 
occurring four days earlier. 
     Failure to differentiate between major and 
minor changes to the corporate name or brand 
name-altering and non-brand name altering CNCs. 
 
 
Limitations. 
Examined strategic name 
changes announcements that 
were accompanied by other 
strategies. For example, one 
CNC announcement was 
classified as a strategic CNC 
announcement also announced a 
change in management control 
and a stock split. This casts 
doubt over the true driver of the 
change in stock price. 
     Eliminated only 7 firms with 
other concurrent 
announcements within a three 
business day window around 
the CNC announcement.   
     Findings may be adversely 
affected by failure to 
differentiate between CNCs 
related to a change in corporate 
image and a change in corporate 
entity.  For example one CNC 
announcement classified as 
strategic CNC (Bridgeport 
Communications to 
WealthHound.com) was the 
result of an acquisition 
occurring four days earlier. 
 
Cooper, 
Khorana, 
Osobov, 
Patel, and Rau 
(2004) 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance  
Event Study 
250 firms 
1998-2001 
Contributions. 
Distinguished between 
CNCs which deleted or added .com as well as 
major and minor changes to the corporate name. 
     Found statistically significant, positive 
abnormal returns of 10.6% (t=2.58) over  
(0, +1) and of 53% (t=2.32) over (-30, +30). 
 
Limitations. 
Failure to differentiate between brand name-
altering and non-brand name altering CNCs.  
 
Limitations. 
Failed to correctly classify all of 
the firms who had undergone a 
change in corporate entity 
within a year of the CNC 
announcement. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 Conceptual Contributions and Limitations 
 
Empirical Contributions and 
Methodological Limitations 
Karbhari, 
Sori, and 
Mohamad 
(2004) 
Corporate 
Ownership 
and Control  
Event Study 
18 firms 
1984-96 
Contributions. 
Found statistically significant, negative abnormal 
returns of -8% (t=-2.57) over  
(-10, +10) for non-failed firms.  Identified the 
following antecedents of CNCs: 
• Change in corporate entity (merger, divestiture)  
• Confusion with another firm 
• Adopt acronym 
• Change in corporate image 
• Diversification     
 
Limitations.  
Failure to differentiate between CNCs related to 
changes in corporate image and changes in 
corporate entity, major and minor changes to the 
corporate name, or brand name altering and non-
brand name altering CNCs. 
 
Contributions. 
Examined failed firms matched 
with non-failed firms. 
 
Limitations. 
Sample (and population) size of 
only 18 CNCs accompanied by 
news of an approved 
restructuring scheme may have 
been the reason they found 
statistically insignificant, 
positive returns for failed firms. 
     By examining CNCs that 
were accompanied by approved 
restructuring scheme news, 
failed to tease out the stock 
price effect of the CNC and the 
stock price effect of the 
approved restructuring news. 
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Howe (1982) was the first researcher to perform an event study of CNC 
announcements and identified a desired change in a stodgy corporate image, the 
diversification (e.g., activities and products) of a firm, and a change in corporate entity 
(i.e., acquisitions, mergers, spinoffs, and reorganizations) as antecedents of CNCs. 
Howe’s (1982) examination of CNCs differed from all subsequent event studies of 
CNCs in that it measured two event dates: 1) the date the CNC was first announced in 
the Wall Street Journal and 2) the date of the meeting at which the shareholders 
approved the CNC. Howe (1982) examined these two event dates because of the 
uncertainty regarding the point in time at which the market is influenced by information 
concerning a CNC. In addition, Howe (1982) displayed additional rigor by attempting to 
confirm the event dates with all 121 firms listed in the sample with an independent 
survey, which received 52 partial or complete responses. Nonetheless, due to the 
incomplete response and incomplete coverage by the Wall Street Journal, both dates 
were not available for all companies. Overall, Howe (1982) found no statistically 
significant share price reaction associated with a CNC related to a new corporate image. 
In addition, Howe’s cross sectional analysis of firms detected no differences among 
firms trading on different stock exchanges (New York Stock Exchange versus American 
Stock Exchange) or changing their name during different time periods (1960s versus 
1970s). 
As previously mentioned, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) introduced the event 
study methodology to the marketing literature and also were the first researchers in the 
marketing discipline to examine the announcements of CNCs and changes in the names 
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of firms’ subsidiaries. Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) identified a change in corporate 
entity (i.e., better describe new combined business) and a change in corporate image 
(i.e., acquire new image and corporate identity) as antecedents of CNCs. Unlike Howe 
(1982), Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) found a statistically significant, positive overall 
stock price effect of 0.61% when they examined 58 CNC announcements.  
One of Horsky and Swyngedouw’s (1987) empirical contributions was their 
exclusion of regulated firms such as public utilities since a CNC cannot signal a change 
in their level of service and rates, which are largely determined by a regulatory body. To 
support this decision, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) persuasively argued that the 
primary demand for electricity is not likely to be affected by the change in a utility 
company’s name. Also fortifying Horsky and Swyngedouw’s (1987) conceptual and 
empirical contribution to the study of CNC announcements was their subsample 
analysis, which distinguished firms according to the degree of change (i.e., radical 
versus cosmetic) to the corporate name, industry served (i.e., financial service versus 
non-financial service), type of firm (i.e., industrial versus consumer), type of good (i.e., 
durable versus non-durable), size of firm (large versus small), risk level (i.e., the 
magnitude of covariance of the firm’s stock return with that of the market), and 
performance of the firm (i.e., well performing and poorly performing). In doing so, they 
found that a statistically significant, negative effect (-1.33%) on stock price for CNC 
announcements by financial service firms, a statistically significant positive effect 
(1.24%) for industrial firms, and a statistically significant, positive effect (0.45%) for 
risky firms. In addition, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) did not detect differences 
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between the stock price effects of radical versus cosmetic changes to the corporate name, 
CNCs by firms producing durable versus nondurable goods, or CNCs by large versus 
small firms. In summary, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) concluded that although 
firms often experience improved profitability after a CNC, the change serves as a signal 
that a firm will improve profit performance by making changes in product offerings and 
organizational changes. 
Ferris (1988) identified a change in corporate entity (i.e., change in organization 
structure, acquisition, divestiture, or emergence of future investment opportunities for 
the firm) and diversification (i.e., intent to restructure assets) as the antecedents of 
CNCs. As part of the subsample analysis, Ferris (1988) examined firms with CNCs that 
that were associated or co-announced with changes in economic or managerial activities, 
shortened or lengthened the character length of the corporate name, adopted a coined 
name, adopted a high tech sounding name (i.e., incorporated onics, ex, or ix in the 
name), represented a geographic expansion, or indicated new market penetration.   
 For changes to high tech names, Ferris (1988) found positive stock price effects 
that approached statistical significance (1.837%, t=1.884, p<.10) for day 0, but 
statistically insignificant effects for (-2, +2). One of Ferris’s (1998) subsample analyses 
was unique from those conducted by other CNC event studies in that it examined the 
effect on stock price of a change to a high tech corporate name that was not 
accompanied by another concurrent announcement.  In doing so, it compared the stock 
price effect of the CNC for firms that had a subsequent increase in earnings per share 
(EPS) to that for firms which had a subsequent decrease in EPS. On one hand, Ferris 
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(1988) found statistically significant, positive stock price effects of 8.912% (t=2.837, 
p<.05) for (-2, +2). On the other hand, for changes to a high tech name that had a 
subsequent decrease in EPS, Ferris (1988) found statistically significant, negative stock 
price effects of -5.76% (t=-2.489, p<.05) for (-2, +2). However, Ferris (1988) failed to 
find statistical significance for any other type of CNC not associated with changes in 
economic or managerial variables. In summary, Ferris (1988) concluded that the form 
and frequency of CNCs are generally statistically insignificant and a change in stock 
price will only occur if the CNC is coupled with changes in economic or managerial 
activities, which reinforce the CNC’s signal of improvement in operational efficiencies, 
investment opportunities, and managerial ability. 
Bosch and Hirschey (1989) identified a change in corporate entity (i.e., mergers, 
acquisitions, divestitures, or restructuring), a change in corporate image, affiliation with 
a brand, a change in product lines, confusion with other companies, diversification, and 
adoption of an acronym as antecedents of the seventy-nine CNC announcements in their 
sample. Bosch and Hirschey’s (1989) subsample analysis examined the difference 
between the stock price effects associated with two antecedents of CNCs (i.e., change in 
corporate entity versus no change in corporate entity). For the twenty firms that changed 
their name following a merger, acquisition, sell-off, spin-off, or some other major 
corporate restructuring and specifically mentioned the change in corporate entity as the 
reason for the subsequent CNC, Bosch and Hirschey (1989) found a weak, positive CAR 
of 3.50% (t=1.71) over the (-10, 0) event window, a strong positive CAR on day -5 of 
1.67% (t=2.70), and no apparent CAR on day 0.  In contrast, the effect of a CNC on day 
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-5 by firms in the subsample of fifty-nine firms with no change in corporate entity was 
only 0.90% (t=2.22).   
Bosch and Hirschey’s (1989) subsample analysis also examined the degree of 
change to the corporate name (major versus minor) and found that minor CNCs not 
statistically significant, over the pre-announcement period, but were positive and 
statistically significant on a daily basis (1.25% on day -5; 0.75% on day 0) and positive 
(2.15%) on a cumulative basis. However, they found that the stock returns were negative 
and statistically significant (-2.71%) on a cumulative basis over the ten day post-
announcement period. In addition, they found that major CNCs were statistically 
insignificant either on a daily or a cumulative basis. Hence, Bosch and Hirschey (1989) 
concluded that the valuation effects of a CNC are only modest and transitory. 
Madura and Tucker (1990) identified diversification of mortgage lenders, 
decreased affiliation with the savings and loan industry, decreased affiliation with a 
geographic region, and confusion with competitors as antecedents of CNCs by thrift 
institutions. Madura and Tucker (1990) examined 12 CNC announcements by thrift 
institutions and found that the largest stock price reaction occurred 3 days before the 
announcement (2.189%), but that was followed by negative CARs resulting in a 
cumulative CAR of -0.442% during the event window (-3, +1), which was statistically 
insignificant.  
Morris and Reyes (1991) identified a change in corporate entity (i.e., 
megamergers, unfriendly takeovers, leveraged buyouts, restructuring), diversification, a 
change in communication efforts, prevention of unattractive phonetic sound or spelling 
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in international markets, and decreased industry affiliation (e.g. fluorocarbons) as 
antecedents of CNCs. Morris and Reyes (1991) examined twenty-eight CNC 
announcements and found that new corporate names possessing more of the five 
functional characteristics (i.e., distinctiveness, relevance, flexibility, memorability, and 
positive nature) have higher abnormal stock returns (5.817%) over the (-14 day, +2 day) 
event window than those with fewer of the functional characteristics (-4.236%). 
Harawa (1992) examined one-hundred and sixty CNC announcements and 
identified a response to internal and external factors as well as a response to CNC fads as 
antecedents of CNCs. Selecting the day that news of a CNC appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal, rather than the press release date, as day 0, Harawa (1992) found statistically 
significant, positive stock price effects of 0.7% (z=2.3364) for day -1, but statistically 
insignificant stock price effects of -0.152% for the (0, +1) window. In addition, Harawa 
(1992) introduced a methodological refinement called the synthetic-time portfolio 
performance methodology, which corrected for model biases occurring in the estimation 
of stock price effects’ sensitivity to trading infrequency.   
Karpoff and Rankine (1994) examined one-hundred and forty-seven CNC 
announcements and identified an increased affiliation with a product line, the adoption 
of an acronym, and the change from an acronym as antecedents of CNCs. In their 
subsample analysis, Karpoff and Rankine (1994) tested the stock price effects of thirty- 
six CNC announcements that did not include a contemporaneous announcement by firms 
that had not previously mentioned the CNC in an SEC proxy statement. For these thirty -
six firms, Karpoff and Rankine (1994) found statistically significant, positive stock price 
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effects of 1.56% (z=2.76) for (-1, 0). Karpoff and Rankine (1994) also tested the stock 
price effects of eighty-eight CNC announcements (including one firm that made a 
contemporaneous announcement) by firms that had previously mentioned the CNC in an 
SEC proxy statement. For these eighty-eight firms, however, Karpoff and Rankine 
(1994) found statistically insignificant stock price effects of 0.01% (z=0.56) for (-1, 0).     
Koku (1997) examined twenty-two CNC announcements and identified a change 
in corporate entity (i.e., mergers, acquisitions), industry affiliation (i.e., better reflect 
new business it has entered), and the intention to become more competitive or signal a 
new way of doing business as antecedents of CNCs. Koku (1997) found a statistically 
significant, positive difference of 3.67 (e.g., equivalent to the difference between a price-
earnings ratio of 21 and a price-earnings ratio of 17.33) between the post-event and pre-
event means of the price-earnings (P/E) ratios (t=2.28, p<.05). In summary, Koku (1997) 
concluded that service companies can improve their P/E ratios when they utilize a CNC 
to signal to customers, competitors, and investors its intentions to become more 
competitive or to signal a new way of doing business (e.g., Datsun to Nissan). 
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) examined ninety-five CNC announcements by 
firms changing to .com corporate names during the Internet craze from 1998 to 1999. 
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) found statistically significant, positive abnormal 
returns of 53% for the five business days around the announcement date with no post-
event negative drift. Lee (2001) examined the effect on stock price as well as trading 
volume of one-hundred and fourteen CNC announcements by firms changing to .com 
corporate names from 1995 to 1999.  Lee (2001) adopted a market signaling perspective 
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and distinguished between cosmetic (i.e., image only) versus strategic CNCs that were 
coupled other changes within the company. Lee (2001) found statistically significant, 
positive abnormal returns of 2.70% over the (-1 day, +1 day) event window. Cooper, 
Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) and Lee’s (2001) findings about the effect of changes to .com 
corporate names may be, as Lee (2001) cautioned, the result of an investing fad and the 
temporary cachet associated with the Internet. 
Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2005) examined two-hundred and 
fifty CNC announcements by firms that were either adding or deleting .com from their 
corporate names between 1998 and 2001. For the thirty-six firms adding .com as part of 
a major change to their corporate name between August 1999 and February 2000, 
Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2005) found statistically significant, positive 
abnormal returns of 26% (t=2.41) over (-2, +2) and statistically significant, positive 
abnormal returns of 108.8% (t=2.88) over (-30, +30) as opposed to the insignificant 
returns of 10.5% (t=0.44) over (-2, +2) and 40.7% (t=0.49) over (-30, +30) for the five 
firms who added .com to their corporate names after September 2000. In addition, for 
the seven firms adding .com as part of a minor change to their corporate name between 
August 1999 and February 2000, Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2005) 
found statistically insignificant abnormal returns of 10.5% (t=1.14) over (-2, +2) but 
statistically significant, positive abnormal returns of 68.7% (t=2.15) over (-30, +30).  
For the thirty-nine firms deleting .com as part of a major change to their 
corporate name after February 2000, Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2005) 
found statistically significant, positive abnormal returns of 13.8% (t=2.29) over (0, +1) 
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and statistically significant, positive abnormal returns of 64% (t=3.12) over (-30, +30) as 
opposed to the insignificant returns of 6.8% (t=0.95) over (0,1) and 10.6% (t=0.27) over 
(-30, +30) for the six firms who deleted .com from their corporate names prior to 
February 2000. In addition, for the twenty-two firms deleting .com as part of a minor 
change to their corporate name after February 2000, Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, 
and Rau (2005) found statistically insignificant abnormal returns of 0.2% (t=0.08) over 
(0, +1) for the twenty-two deleting .com as part of a minor change to their corporate 
name after February 2000. In summary, Lee’s (2001) reservations about the potentially 
temporary cachet of the Internet were later found to be justified when Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2004) found that investors reacted positively to a CNC by a 
firm that removed .com from its corporate name following the Internet “crash” of mid-
2000 and concluded that investors are potentially influenced by cosmetic effects and that 
managers rationally time corporate actions to take advantage of these biases. 
Most recently, Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad (2004) examined eighteen CNC 
announcements between 1984 and 1996 and identified a change in corporate entity (i.e., 
merger, divestiture), confusion with another firm, adoption of an acronym, a change in 
corporate image, and diversification as antecedents of CNCs. In their subsample 
analysis, Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad (2004) distinguished failed firms (i.e., firms 
protected under article one-hundred and seventy-six of the Malaysian Companies Act of 
1965 that received approval from the regulatory authorities to undertake a restructuring 
scheme to revive their financial condition) from a control group of matched non-failed 
firms and found statistically significant, negative abnormal returns of -8% over the (-10, 
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+10) event window for non-failed firms and statistically insignificant, positive returns 
for failed firms. 
General Methodological Limitations of Event Studies 
 As previously mentioned, previous researchers have identified the noise in stock 
prices, the possible difficulty in identifying the date of an event, and the potential 
clustering of events as three important limitations of event studies (Chaney, Devinney, 
and Winer 1991). In addition to market noise, the selection of an event date, and the 
clustering of events, there are other limitations of previous event studies that are 
addressed in this section. These events include the statistically insignificant impact of an 
event, sample size, selection of event date, departures from traditional event study 
methodology, and generalizability.  
Noise. Stock prices have noise, or other information, coming into the market. 
Noise is defined as “price and volume fluctuations that can confuse interpretation of 
market direction” that is “caused by program trades, dividend rolls, and other phenome-
na not reflective of general sentiment” (http://money.cnn.com/services/glossary/n.html). 
Since stock prices are noisy, a sufficiently important event is required to cause a 
reaction that can be distinguished from the normal background noise (Chaney, 
Devinney, and Winer 1991). The effect of noise on event studies is subject to debate. On 
one hand, Brown and Warner’s (1985) simulation found simultaneous events, on 
average, have a statistically insignificant effect on a firm’s stock price. In other words, 
although individual firms’ stock prices are unquestionably affected by noise, the average 
of the positive and negative effects of the noise on all firms is statistically insignificant.  
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On the other hand, according to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), if a firm were to 
announce a financially relevant event within the window of another event, then that firm 
should be removed from the sample.  For example, firms might declare dividends, 
announce an impending merger, sign a major contract, announce a new project, file a 
large lawsuit, or announce unexpected earnings. Since the event study method attributes 
the abnormal return to a particular event, if other financially relevant events are 
occurring during the event window, it makes it difficult to isolate the impact of the event 
under consideration (McWilliams and Siegel 1997).  
 Nonetheless, only six of the twenty-seven event studies of marketing phenomena 
(e.g., Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Bobinski and Ramirez 1994; Cornwell, Pruitt, and 
Clark 2005; Filbeck, Gorman, Greenlee, and Speh 2004; Geyskens, Geilens, and 
Dekimpe 2002; Hozier and Schatzberg 2000) addressed the noise confound and 
specifically omitted announcements contaminated by the news of other important 
concurrent announcements made during the event window from their samples.  
Many of the other studies (e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Hendricks 
and Singhal 1997; Kulkarni, Vora, and Brown 1993; Mathur, Mathur, and Gleason 1998; 
Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan 1997; Miyazaki and Morgan 2001) were silent as to 
treatment of events with concurrent announcements during their event windows, which 
confounds the explanation and interpretation of their findings. For example, although 
Mathur and Mathur (1995) found changes in advertising slogans to have a statistically 
insignificant effect on firms’ stock prices during the three business days (-1, +1) 
surrounding the announcement, Mathur and Mathur (1995) attributed the statistically 
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significant, positive CAR of 0.91% for (+2, +10) to some delayed investor reaction to 
the news of a change in advertising slogan. This conclusion seems to be problematic 
because the reaction may also be affected by other announcements during the (+2, +10) 
window.  In addition, when studying the effect of an advertising agency’s 
announcements of new accounts, Mathur and Mathur (1996) attributed the firms’ 
statistically significant, positive CAR of 1.83% for (+6, +10) to investors’ positive 
reassessment of the potential benefits of obtaining a new account. This conclusion also 
seems to be problematic because the reaction may also be affected by other 
announcements during the (+6, +10) window.  Finally, when studying the effect of 
“green” promotional efforts, Mathur and Mathur (2000) departed from traditional event 
study methodology and ignored the assumption of efficient markets hypothesis that there 
will be an immediate reaction to news (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985; Fama 1970; 
Fama and French 1990; Muth 1961). In doing so, they attributed the firms’ statistically 
significant, negative CARs of -0.84% for (+1, +5) and -3.14% for (-10, +10) to investors 
considering them to be value-destroying in nature. This, too, may be problematic 
because the reaction may also be affected by concurrent announcements during the (+1, 
+5) and (-10, +10) windows.   
Surprisingly, not all researchers of CNCs (e.g., Ferris 1988, Koku 1997, Lee 
2001) omitted announcements contaminated by the news of other important concurrent 
announcements from their samples. Moreover, three (Ferris 1988; Koku 1997; Lee 2001) 
of the thirteen CNC event studies explicitly stated that they included firms that made 
concurrent announcements in their sample. Ferris (1988), for example, examined CNCs 
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that were coupled with other economic or managerial changes including critical 
decisions affecting factors such as liability composition, asset structure, investment 
schedules, or geographical sales expansion. In addition, Koku (1997) did not eliminate 
firms with concurrent announcements from the sample. In fact, only four of the twenty-
eight firms in Koku’s (1997) sample released no other information within a week of the 
CNC. 
Lee (2001) examined strategic name change announcements that were 
accompanied by other strategies. For example, one CNC announcement (Boraxx 
Technologies to QuadXSports.com) that was classified by Lee (2001) as a strategic CNC 
announcement also announced a change in management control and a stock split.  
Another CNC announcement (Alpha Microsystems to AlphaServ.com) also announced 
its earnings.  These concurrent announcements make it difficult to identify the actual 
drivers of the changes in the firms’ stock prices. 
In addition, three of the thirteen CNC event studies (Bosch and Hirschey 1989; 
Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004; Morris and Reyes 1991) did not specify whether 
they omitted announcements contaminated by the news of other important concurrent 
announcements made during the event window from their samples. As was the case with 
the other event studies of marketing phenomena, this makes it difficult to interpret their 
findings. For instance, Bosch and Hirschey (1989) did not mention whether they 
checked for concurrent event announcements during (+1, +10), but still concluded that 
minor CNCs were positive (2.15%) over the pre-announcement period of (-10, 0), but 
not statistically significant on a cumulative basis, as well as statistically significant and 
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negative (-2.71%, t=-1.98, p<.05) on a cumulative basis over the post announcement 
period (+1, +10). 
Event date is not easily identified. The date of the event (i.e., the first date at 
which the occurrence of the event became publicly known) may not be easily 
identifiable. Although a public announcement of an event may have occurred, it is highly 
difficult to pinpoint when the market incorporates this new information into the stock 
price. A variety of information is continuously provided to the financial markets and 
incorporated in the firm’s stock price. This information flow hinders the evaluation of 
the announcement of a specific event’s effect on the firm’s stock price because the 
amorphous nature of the information, which increases the difficulty of determining 
exactly when the information is released. Therefore, it is often possible to witness 
abnormal returns prior to the date of the public announcement (Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991).  
The daily change in a firm’s stock price around the time of an event’s formal 
announcement incorporates only part of the information signaled by the announcement.  
As such, rather than a full evaluation of the event’s effect on a firm’s market value, it is 
a consensus of opinion that is reached about the economic value of the event and its 
likelihood of success. As a result, the event’s final stock price effect often represents 
only a small portion of the event’s actual economic value (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 
1991). 
Due to the uncertainty of the event date, the news sources should be carefully 
checked and events with ambiguous dates of occurrence removed from the sample 
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(Mathur and Mathur 1995). For instance, the event date can be unclear when a CNC is 
announced to the public after its occurrence in a monthly or bi-weekly magazine. The 
greater the certainty of the announcement date, the greater the statistically significant, 
positive stock price reaction to the announcement. Research by, Filbeck, Gorman, 
Greenlee, and Speh (2005) found that when the advertisements for which there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding their initial public appearance are added to the 
sample, the significant abnormal returns disappear during the three business day event 
window.  
Events may cluster. Events may cluster in two ways.  First, multiple important 
events are often simultaneously announced. For example, firms often use the same press 
release to announce earnings and major changes in the firm. In addition, firms often 
attempt to counter negative information, such as low quarterly earnings, with positive 
information such as the recruitment of a major new account (Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991). Second, multiple firms’ announcements of similar events may cluster on 
specific event dates and necessitate estimating models simultaneously in order to avoid 
covariance between their errors (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991). For example, 
Ford and Chrysler often made product recall announcement on the same day (Hoffer, 
Pruitt, and Reilly 1988; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985). 
Statistically insignificant impact of event. The market reaction to an event 
announcement represents an aggregate expectation. Unanticipated events without 
uniform expectational effects may appear to have a statistically insignificant impact 
when measured by their stock price effect. For example, a particular group of investors 
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may exhibit positive expectations for an unanticipated event while another group has 
negative expectations. As a result, a firm’s stock will be traded between these two 
groups. If the amount of stock held by the group with negative expectations equals the 
amount of stock desired by the groups with positive expectations, then the trading will 
have no effect on the firm’s overall stock price (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991).  
Illustrating the frequently encountered insignificant impact of events are the 
statistically insignificant stock price effects that have been found during particular event 
windows for announcements of new products (Eddy and Saunders 1980), product recalls 
(Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1988), firms firing their advertising agencies (Kulkarni, Vora, 
and Brown 1993), new advertising slogans (Mathur and Mathur 1995), new product 
delays by firms with shorter product life cycles (Hendricks and Singhal 1997), internet 
advertising of services (Mathur, Mathur, and Gleason 1998), green products, recycling 
efforts, appointments of environmental policies (Mathur and Mathur 2000), major league 
sports’ official product sponsorships (Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark 2005), and Clio awards 
(Tippins and Kunkel 2006). In addition, no relationship was found between stock price 
performance and advertisements to the investment community (Bobinski and Ramirez 
1994) or Super Bowl ad likeability or frequency (Kim and Morris 2003). 
Moreover, Mathur and Mathur (1996) found that, in general, the news of a new 
advertising account has a negative effect on a publicly traded advertising agency’s stock 
price. They also found that announcements of larger new accounts are better received by 
investors than announcements of smaller new accounts and that new account 
announcements by firms with relatively weak financial performance over the three-year 
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period prior to the announcement are not well received by investors (Mathur and Mathur 
1996). In addition, Mathur and Mathur (2000) found significant negative CARs of  
-0.84% for (+1, +5) and -3.14% for (10, +10) for announcements for green promotional 
efforts. Finally, most Super Bowl advertisers showed significant negative abnormal 
returns and more than two-thirds of the .com advertisers noticed a large drop in traffic a 
week after the Super Bowl (Kim and Morris 2003). In summary, these studies illustrate 
the difficulties associated with linking changes in stock prices to specific marketing-
based activities. 
Sample size. It is generally accepted that a small sample size can limit the power 
of statistical tests and may understate the actual result. Moreover, insufficient sample 
size may have prevented other concurrent studies (e.g., Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; 
Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004; Koku 1997; Madura and Tucker 1990; Morris and 
Reyes 1991) from testing for the effects of potentially important variables. With larger 
sample sizes comprised of CNCs from a larger span over time, they might have been 
able to recognize the stock price effects from brand name altering versus non-brand 
name altering CNCs, major versus minor changes to the corporate name, and CNCs 
related to a change in corporate image versus a properly classified change in corporate 
entity (i.e., a firm undergoing an acquisition, merger, etc. within the year preceding the 
CNC.   
Horsky and Swyngedouw’s (1987) use of forty-nine firms in their subsample 
analysis may have contributed to its lack of statistically significant results for consumer 
firms (e.g., ten of forty-nine firms). Furthermore, had Bosch and Hirschey (1989)’s 
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sample size been large enough to measure major changes to the corporate name during a 
CNC related to a change in corporate image, they might have reached the opposite 
conclusion that major, not minor, changes to the corporate name result in positive stock 
price effects. Moreover, Madura and Tucker’s (1990) diminutive sample of twelve 
financial service firms may explain their inability to find a statistically significant stock 
price effect. 
Selection of event date. Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) selected the date that the 
announcement of either a forthcoming or signed celebrity endorsement contract first 
appeared in the print media as the event date. Recognizing this limitation, they also 
tested (-1, 0) and found significance.  Miyazaki and Morgan (2001) chose the first 
mention of the CNC in the media as the event date, but recognized that the information 
leakage may occur through non-print media during (-5, -2). 
Harawa (1992) selected the day that news of a CNC appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal, rather than the press release date, as day 0. This failed to capture any 
information leakage prior to the press release date and  may explain why Harawa found 
statistically significant, positive stock price effects for day -1 of 0.7% (z=2.3364), but 
statistically insignificant effects of -0.152% for (0, +1).  
Other departures from traditional event study methodology. According to Hoffer, 
Pruitt, and Reilly (1988), Jarrell and Peltzman’s (1985) results were affected by 
departures from traditional event study methodology such as the inclusion of events with 
overlapping event windows in their sample.  For example, the effect on Chrysler’s stock 
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price of a recall announcement by Ford during the same event window as a recall 
announcement by Chrysler was contaminated by Chrysler’s announcements. 
Generalizability. By focusing on firms affiliated with a particular celebrity 
endorser or firms competing in a particular industry, event studies can limit the 
generalizability of their findings to firms from other industries. Mathur, Mathur, and 
Rangan (1997) may have overstated the potential benefits of celebrity endorsers, in 
general, because their analysis was centered on Michael Jordan, a celebrity who was 
recognized as perhaps the leading endorser in the United States. Sorescu, Chandy, and 
Prabhu (2003) warned that the remarkable advantage that dominant firms in the highly 
concentrated pharmaceutical industry enjoy in the radical innovation process may raise 
questions about its generalizability. It is possible that small players cannot break the 
barriers to entry that their larger counterparts impose. It is also possible that 
nondominant firms lack the incentive to innovate due to being disadvantaged because of 
the long FDA approval process (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). 
Conclusion. The general limitations of event studies listed above are of particular 
importance to event studies in marketing because of the inherent characteristics of 
marketing events, which often evolve gradually and thereby do not take the form of 
distinct events. Since marketing decisions evolve slowly, the event announcements are 
often anticipated and surprise few investors. In addition, a marketing event 
announcement’s economic value is often small relative to the firm’s total market value. 
As a result, many significant marketing events will be left undetected due to their 
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gradual evolution and the noisy nature of stock prices (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 
1991). 
 In addition, the methodological challenges caused by the general limitations of 
event study methodology, as within the previous thirteen event studies of CNC, present 
several additional theoretical criticisms that can also be leveled against this stream of 
research. 
 Insufficient classification of CNCs leading to spurious results. By not modeling 
plausible other variables (e.g., change in corporate image versus change in corporate 
entity) the variance to be explained by the non-specified/omitted variables is manifested 
on the degree of change (i.e., major versus minor). 
Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) did not recognize the distinction between 
changes in corporate image and changes in corporate entity. Instead, they only excluded 
CNCs from the sample that made important concurrent announcements such as 
acquisitions, mergers, and divestitures on the event day itself. This prevented Horsky 
and Swyngedouw (1987) from identifying the effects of CNCs related to a change in 
corporate entity because they did not identify the firms that had undergone a change in 
corporate entity within a year of the CNC announcement as has been done by this 
dissertation. In addition, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) recognized the distinction 
between major and minor changes to the corporate name, but failed to find a difference 
in their statistically insignificant stock price effects because they did not distinguish 
major changes from minor changes to the corporate name during CNCs related to a 
change in corporate image. Instead, they grouped them with major changes to the 
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corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate entity, which may have 
led to their statistically insignificant findings. For example, Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) would not have recognized that the CNC announcement of the change from 
Hasbro Industries to Hasbro Bradley was related to a change in corporate entity, namely 
Hasbro’s acquisition of Milton Bradley four months before the CNC. 
Lee (2001) did not differentiate between changes in corporate image and changes 
in corporate entity.  For example one CNC announcement classified by Lee (2001) as 
strategic CNC (Bridgeport Communications to WealthHound.com) was the result of an 
acquisition occurring four days earlier. 
Model underspecification. Studies that examine simple bivariate correlations are 
open to the criticism of likely ‘omitted variable bias’ (Bharadwaj 1994: 31). By not 
modeling plausible other variables (e.g., brand name altering versus non-brand name 
altering), the variance to be explained by the non-specified/omitted variables may be 
manifested on the degree of change (i.e., major versus minor), type of good (e.g., durable 
versus non-durable; financial services versus non-financial services), type of firm (e.g., 
industrial versus consumer), prior performance of the firm, or riskiness of the firm (see 
Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987).   
 Given this dissertation’s examination of CNC related to a change in corporate 
image, it is fitting to conclude the literature review with a review of the previous 
literature examining the perceived characteristics of corporate names, which contribute 
greatly to the firm’s corporate image. 
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Perceived Characteristics of Corporate Names 
Researchers have paid a great deal of attention to concepts such as brand equity 
(e.g., Aaker 1991, 1996; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000; Farquhar 1989; Keller 1993, 
1998; Kapferer 1992, 1997), brand extensions (e.g., Aaker and Keller 1990; Broniarczyk 
and Alba 1994; Kapferer 1992, 1997; Keller 1993, 1998; Keller and Aaker 1991), brand 
identity (e.g., Aaker 1996; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000) and brand personality (e.g., 
Aaker 1996; Aaker 1997; Plummer 1985).  
Much of the research focusing specifically on corporate names has been in the 
form of normative studies that prescribe what characteristics make a successful brand or 
corporate name (e.g., Charmasson 1988; Garbett 1988; Keller 1993, 1998, 2003; 
McNeal and Zeren 1981; Robertson 1989; Shipley, Hooley, and Wallace 1988; Zinkhan 
and Martin 1987), the linguistic distinction among brand and corporate names (e.g., 
Collins 1977; Vanden Bergh, Adler, and Oliver 1987) or the process by which to select a 
name (e.g., Charmasson 1988; Garbett 1988; Kohli and Thakor 1997; McNeal and Zeren 
1981; Peterson and Ross 1971). Other studies have examined the influence of the 
number of associations related to the brand name or the inclusion of frequently used 
words in the brand name (e.g., Meyers-Levy 1989).   
Previous researchers have identified thirteen criteria considered in brand name 
selection and list them in order of importance as follows (McNeal and Zeren 1981): 
1. Descriptive of the product’s benefits 
2. Memorable 
3. Fit with the company’s image and other products’ image 
4. Trademark availability 
5. Promotable and advertisable 
6. Uniqueness versus competitiveness 
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7. Length 
8. Ease of pronunciation 
9. Positive connotations to potential users 
10. Suited to the package 
11. Modern or contemporary 
12. Understandable 
13. Persuasive 
 
The ten highest ranking of these thirteen criteria were then categorized into five 
functional characteristics: distinctiveness, relevance, memorability, flexibility, and 
positive nature (Morris and Reyes 1991), which closely resembled the four key criteria 
for services names (i.e., distinctiveness, relevance, memorability, flexibility) identified 
by Berry, Lefkowith, and Clark (1986).  
Distinctiveness. A distinctive corporate name is one that immediately identifies 
the firm and distinguishes it from its competitors (Berry, Lefkowith, and Clark 1986).  
The distinctiveness of a corporate name is a function of its inherent uniqueness as well 
as its uniqueness in the context of competitors in the product category (Keller 1998).  
Distinctive names as atypical for the product category (e.g., Apple computers), unusual 
word combinations (e.g., Toys-R-Us), or coined words (e.g., Exxon) (Keller 1998).  
Other examples of distinctive corporate names include those bearing an uncommon 
surname of the founder (e.g., Smucker’s).  Researchers’ opinions about using surnames 
are mixed.  Genuine surnames can be distinctive but problems exist for the firm’s 
founder if the firm fails and for the firm when the founder dies (Garbett 1988). Historic 
industry inventor surnames, however, are distinctive and helpful and it has been argued 
that Automatic Sprinkler Corporation’s change to A-T-O was unsuccessful, but changing 
to Figgy International was beneficial because it helped personalize the firm (Garbett 
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1988). On the other hand, previous researchers have warned against the use of family 
names because of the complications they cause during the sale of a firm.  For instance, 
the new buyer may not wish to operate under the seller’s name and erase much of the 
goodwill associated with it.  Or the seller may be concerned about how his personal 
reputation will be affected by any bad performance by the buyer (Charmasson 1988). 
Relevance. A relevant corporate name conveys the nature of a firm and its 
benefits (Berry, Lefkowith, and Clark 1986). Previous researchers have extended the 
concept of relevance to include typicality (Zinkhan and Martin 1987) and symbolic 
isomorphism (Glynn and Abzug 1998). In a study of consumer attitudes toward brand 
names, typical was defined as similar or to other names in the product category and it 
was suggested that the process of inferential belief formation helps customers remember 
typical names, but does not help them remember atypical names (Zinkhan and Martin 
1987). Drawing theoretically from institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), 
previous researchers employed a similar logic and defined symbolic isomorphism as “the 
resemblance of an organization’s symbolic attributes to other organizations within its 
institutional field” and suggested that symbolic isomorphism increases organizational 
legitimacy (Glynn and Abzug 2002). 
Citing Robertson (1989), Keller (1998) pointed out that brand names which 
suggest the product or service category (e.g., Ticketron ticket selling service) can aid 
brand recall (Keller 1998; Robertson 1989).  The arguments above also hold true for 
corporate names. Previous researchers, however, have warned about the potentially 
restrictive nature of brands that are highly descriptive of the product category or its 
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attributes and benefits (Keller, Heckler, and Houston 1998).  For example, it may be 
challenging for the JuicyJuice brand to introduce a soft drink extension (Keller 1998). 
Memorability. A memorable corporate name can be easily understood, used and 
recalled (Berry, Lefkowith and Clark 1986).  Researchers have found that linguistic 
qualities can increase a name’s memorability. Linguistic qualities can take the form of a 
phonetic device such as alliteration, assonance (i.e., vowel repetition), consonance (i.e., 
consonant repetition), masculine rhyme (i.e., rhyme of last syllable), feminine rhyme 
(i.e., unaccented syllable before accented syllable), onomatopoeia (phonetic 
resemblance), clipping, blending, and initial plosives (i.e., hard sounding speech 
sounds). They can also be an orthographic device such as unusual or incorrect spellings, 
abbreviations, and acronyms. Another option is using a morphological device like 
affixation or compounding.  Finally, semantic devices such as metaphor, metonymy (i.e., 
applying one quality for another), synecdoche (i.e., substituting a part for the whole), 
personification, oxymoron, paronomasia (i.e., pun and word plays), and semantic 
appositeness (i.e., fit of name with object) can also contribute to the name’s 
memorability (Vanden Bergh, Adler, and Oliver 1987).  
Flexibility. A flexible corporate name has been defined as broad enough to 
convey a firm’s current business and its foreseeable expansions (Berry, Lefkowith, and 
Clark 1986). Yet, this characteristic can conflict with the relevance of a corporate name 
(Keller 1998). Hence, corporate names should ideally be descriptive of a firm’s principal 
activity, but flexible enough to allow for expansion (Garbett 1988). Moreover, 
sacrificing the ability to communicate a firm’s activities may be necessary for a 
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conglomerate, but this should be avoided during a firm’s early developmental stages, 
when the firm can afford to have a specific name while seeking short-term profits 
(Garbett 1988). When firms diversify, they will likely drop their useful business 
description as did US Steel and United Aircraft when they changed to USX and United 
Technologies, respectively.   
Likeability. It has been suggested that corporate names are likable when they are 
rich in visual and verbal imagery and inherently fun and interesting (Keller 2003). 
Similarly, the positive nature of a brand name has been defined as providing positive 
connotations to potential users (McNeal and Zeren 1981). 
 The interdependence among distinctiveness, relevance, memorability, flexibility, 
and likeability is evidenced by the possibility that an improvement in one of these 
characteristics can result in the decline in another.  For example, when American Sugar 
Co. changed its name to Amstar, it increased the flexibility of its corporate name by 
erasing its industry affiliation, but decreased its relevance.  Interestingly, Amstar later 
decided to sacrifice the flexibility of its corporate name and increase its relevance by 
renaming itself again as Domino Sugar Co. Thus, it is important to consider the 
aggregate effect on customers’ perceptions of the new corporate name’s distinctiveness, 
relevance, memorability, flexibility, and likeability when judging the impact of a CNC.    
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CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 This section presents a conceptual model of the antecedents of a corporate name 
change and its effect on a firm’s stock price (see Figure 1).  It also discusses the 
theoretical and empirical support for each of the research questions addressed in this 
dissertation. 
The conceptual model tested examines the relationship between CNCs and firms’ 
corporate performance. Firm performance is assessed using cumulative abnormal 
returns, a measure developed in capital market theory, which is defined as the sum of 
differences between the expected return on a stock (systematic risk multiplied by the 
realized market return) and the actual return often used to evaluate the impact of news on 
a stock price. Capital market theory assumes that stock prices reflect the time- and risk-
discounted present value of future cash flows which are expected to accrue to the firm 
(Rappaport 1997; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004) and, according to the semistrong 
efficient markets/rational expectations hypothesis (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985; Fama 
1970; Fama and French 1990; Muth 1961), reflect all publicly available information. 
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FIGURE 1 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
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 As a result, this dissertation measures the impact of a firm’s first CNC 
announcement because only a CNC announcement which was unanticipated by investors 
should cause a change in the firm’s stock price. Moreover, it should occur as soon as the 
market learns of the change, and the magnitude of the change should serve as an 
unbiased estimate of the value of changes to the firm’s expected cash flows (Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 1987; Schwert 1981; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004).  
Antecedents of CNCs 
Koku (1997) distinguished among three antecedents of CNCs: 1) mergers and 
acquisitions (i.e., new corporate entity); 2) the entry of a new line of business (i.e., 
increase or decrease affiliation with industry); or 3) the desire to signal to customers, 
competitors, and investors its intentions to become more competitive or to signal a new 
way of doing business. This dissertation differentiates a CNC related to a change in 
corporate image from a CNC related to a change in corporate entity or confusion with 
another firm. However, due to the relative scarcity of firms, and the attendant problems 
with sample size, that are confused with other firms, only the first two antecedents of 
CNCs are examined (see Table 4). 
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TABLE 4 
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS, OPERATIONALIZATIONS, AND EXAMPLES 
Key Concept Conceptual Definition Operationalization Examples 
CNC related to a 
change in 
corporate entity 
A CNC related to a change in 
the ownership of a firm or 
one of its business units  
 
“A result of mergers and 
acquisitions to better describe 
the new combined business” 
(Horsky and Swyngedouw 
1987: 320) 
A CNC that occurs 
less than one year 
after a merger, 
acquisition, 
divestiture, 
reorganization, or 
change in ownership 
• AOL and Time Warner to 
AOL Time Warner 
• Exxon and Mobil to 
ExxonMobil 
• General Cinema Corporation 
and  
• Harcourt Brace to Harcourt 
General 
• Price Waterhouse and Coopers 
& Lybrand to 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
CNC related to a 
change in 
corporate image 
A CNC related to a change in 
what stakeholders actually 
think about the firm(Brown, 
Dacin, Pratt, and Whetten 
2006) 
 
“An attempt to acquire a new 
image and corporate identity” 
(Horsky and  
Swyngedouw 1987: 320) 
A CNC that results 
from diversification, 
international 
expansion or a 
desire to increase or 
decrease the 
corporate name’s 
affiliation with a 
brand, business unit, 
event, attribute, 
industry, or 
geographic region 
• Surviving Enron divisions to 
CrossCountry Energy 
Corporation and Primsa 
Energy International; 
• UAL to Allegis to UAL 
(decrease affiliation with 
event) 
• Kentucky Fried Chicken to 
KFC (decrease affiliation with 
attribute) 
• Hershey Chocolate 
Corporation to   Hershey 
Foods Corporation; 
• Standard Press Steel to SPS 
Technologies 
• US Steel to USX 
• United Aircraft to United 
Technologies 
• RJ Reynolds Tobacco to RJ 
Reynolds Industries 
• KPMG Consulting to 
BearingPoint 
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers to 
Monday (decrease affiliation 
with industry) 
Standard Oil of Ohio to 
Standard Oil (decrease 
affiliation with geographic 
region) 
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Key Concept Conceptual Definition Operationalization Examples 
Major CNC A CNC which creates a new 
corporate name that is not 
immediately recognizable as 
related to the previous 
corporate name 
 
A change “to a radically 
different name such as from 
Billy the Kid to BTK and 
Alaska Interstate to Enstar” 
(Horsky and Swyngedouw 
1987: 327) 
 
“’Major’ name changes are 
those changes such that the 
new name is entirely 
different form the old, e.g., 
Varity Corp. versus Massey-
Ferguson Ltd.” (Bosch and 
Hirschey 1989: 70) 
A CNC which 
creates a new 
corporate name that 
is not immediately 
recognizable as 
related to the 
previous corporate 
name 
 
• Dayton-Hudson to Target 
Minor CNC A CNC which creates a new 
corporate name that is 
immediately recognizable as 
related to the previous 
corporate name 
 
“A cosmetic change such as 
from Echlin Mfg. to Echlin 
and from Paine Webber to 
Paine Webber Group” 
(Horsky and Swyngedouw 
1987: 327) 
 
“’Minor’ changes would not 
completely affect company 
recognition, e.g., Lowenstein 
M. Corp versus M. 
Lowenstein & Sons Corp., 
and might reflect the 
‘continuity’ of the evolving 
corporate identity, such as 
Reading and Bates Corp. 
versus Reading and Bates 
Offshore Drilling Corp.” 
(Bosch and Hirschey 1989: 
70) 
 
A CNC which 
creates a new 
corporate name that 
is immediately 
recognizable as 
related to the 
previous corporate 
name 
• US Air to US Airways 
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Key Concept Conceptual Definition Operationalization Examples 
Brand name 
altering CNC 
A CNC which results in a 
change in one or more of the 
brand names facing the 
customer 
A CNC which 
results in a change 
in one or more of the 
brand names facing 
the customer. This 
can occur when the 
CNC creates an 
entirely new brand 
name or results in 
the adoption by 
existing brands of 
another existing 
brand name. 
 
• Andersen Consulting to 
Accenture (entirely new brand 
name) 
• Deloitte Consulting to Braxton 
Consulting (another existing 
brand name) 
Non-brand name 
altering CNC 
A CNC which does not result 
in a change in one or more of 
the brand names facing the 
customer 
A CNC which does 
not result in a 
change in one or 
more of the brand 
names facing the 
customer 
• Dayton-Hudson to Target  
• United Aircraft to United 
Technologies 
• Consolidated Foods to Sara Lee 
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CNC related to a change in corporate image. Previous researchers have found 
that a frequent reason for a CNC is a firm’s desire to create a new corporate image 
(Bosch and Hirschey 1989; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Howe 1982; Morris and 
Reyes 1991). As previously mentioned, however, many researchers are skeptical about 
the impact that a new image created by a CNC will have if it is not coupled with other 
substantial changes within the company. For example, Howe (1982) concluded that 
keeping a firm’s name up to date is unnecessary because there is no financial benefit to 
changing a corporation’s name. 
The organizational identity literature distinguishes between corporate identity, 
what organizational members believe to be central, enduring, and distinctive (Albert and 
Whetten 1985), and corporate image, the way organizational members believe others see 
the organization, to gauge how outsiders are judging them (Dutton and Dukerich 1991). 
When there is a discrepancy between the firm’s identity and image, managers may take 
actions to resolve that discrepancy (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000). A CNC is one way 
to do so (Lee 2001) since it can serve as an investment in intangible capital designed to 
alter popular perceptions regarding a firm’s corporate identity (Hirschey 1985; Karbhari, 
Sori, and Mohamad 2004). 
When addressing the topic of corporate image, corporate identity, and corporate 
reputation, researchers have used a variety of terms and concepts which have been 
recently classified as identity, intended image, construed image, and reputation (Brown, 
Dacin, Pratt, and Whetten 2006).  
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Identity has been defined as the central, enduring, and distinctive “mental 
associations about the organization held by organizational members” (Brown, Dacin, 
Pratt, and Whetten 2006: 101). Previous research related to the concept of identity has 
addressed the question of “Who are we as an organization?” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, and 
Whetten 2006: 101) with examinations of collective identity (Pratt 2003), corporate 
personality (Markwick and Fill 1997), identity or organizational identity (Davies 2003; 
Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000; Hatch and Schultz 1997; Pratt and Foreman 2000b; 
Whetten and Mackey 2002), and perceived organizational identity (Ashforth and 
Johnson 2001; Ashforth and Miel 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail 1994). 
Intended image has been defined as the central, enduring, and distinctive “mental 
associations about the organization that organization leaders want important audiences to 
hold” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten 2006: 101). Previous research related to the 
concept of intended image has addressed the question of “What does the organization 
want others to think about the organization?” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten 2006: 
101) with examinations of corporate identity (Balmer 1998; Balmer and Gray 1999; 
Bernstein 1984; Dacin and Brown 2002; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Gray and Smeltzer 
1985; Hatch and Schultz 1997; Higgins and Bannister 1992; Ind 1990; Markwick and 
Fill 1997; Melewar and Jenkins 2002; Melewar, Karaosmanoglu, and Paterson 2005; 
Steidl and Emery 1997; van Riel 1995; Whetten and Mackey 2002), desired corporate 
identity (van Rekom 1997; van Riel and Balmer 1997), desired future image (Gioia, 
Schultz, and Corley 2000), desired identity (van Riel 1997), desired organizational 
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image (Scott and Lane 2000), image (Whetten 1997), and projected image (Gioia, 
Schultz, and Corley 2000). 
Construed image has been defined as the central, enduring, and distinctive 
“mental associations that organizational members believe others outside the organization 
hold about the organization” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten 2006: 101). Previous 
research related to the concept of intended image has addressed the question of “What 
does the organization believe others think of the organization?” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt and 
Whetten 2006: 101) with examinations of construed external image (Dutton, Dukerich, 
and Harquail 1994; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000), perceived external prestige 
(Smidts, Pruyn, and van Riel 2001), perceived organizational prestige (Bhattacharya, 
Rao, and Glynn 1995; van Riel and Balmer 1997), and reflected stakeholder appeals 
(Scott and Lane 2000). 
Reputation has been defined as the central, enduring, and distinctive “mental 
associations about the organization actually held by others outside the organization” 
(Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten 2006: 101). Previous research related to the concept 
of reputation has addressed the question of “What do stakeholders actually think of the 
organization?” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten 2006: 101) with examinations of 
company evaluation (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), corporate associations (Berens and 
van Riel 2004; Berens, van Riel, and van Bruggen 2005; Brown 1998; Brown and Dacin 
1997; Dacin and Brown 2002), corporate evaluation (Brown and Dacin 1997), corporate 
identity (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), corporate image (Dowling 1994; Johnson and 
Zinkhan 1990; Kennedy (1977; Markwick and Fill 1997; Martineau 1958a; Martineau 
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1958b; Mertes 1971; Spector 1961; Topalian 1984; van Rekom 1997), image (Barich 
and Kotler 1991; Briston 1960; Britt 1971; Carlson 1963; Cohen 1963; Davies, Chun, da 
Silva, and Roper 2003; Dichter 1985; Dowling 1986; Enis 1967; Fombrun 1996; Garbett 
1988; Gregory 1991; Gronroos 1984; Pharaoh 1982), organizational image (Hatch and 
Schultz 1997), organizational reputation (Scott and Lane 2000), reputation (Dacin and 
Brown 2002; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000; van Riel 1997; Whetten 1997), and 
transient impressions (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000).  
 As such, when this dissertation refers to a CNC related to a change in corporate 
image, it would be characterized by Brown, Dacin, Pratt, and Whetten (2006) as a CNC 
related to a change in corporate reputation. Thus, adopting Brown, Dacin, Pratt, and 
Whetten’s (2006) definition of reputation, a CNC is operationalized as related to a 
change in corporate image when it results from an increase or decrease in the corporate 
name’s affiliation with an industry, brand, business unit, event, attribute, or geographic 
region. 
Affiliation with an industry. A firm that wishes to emphasize or de-emphasize its 
affiliation with a particular industry will often change its corporate name. For example, 
CNCs were common in the railroad and mining industries in the 1850s; the automobile 
industry in the 1910s; the airplane industry in the late 1920s; the high-tech industry in 
the 1960s; and the bio-genetic industry in the 1980s (Gordon 2001). In all of these 
growth periods, investors often appeared to eschew due diligence just to get a piece of 
the action (Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004). Case in point, when 
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airplane stocks were popular during the 1920s, investors rushed to invest in Seaboard 
Airlines, which was actually a renamed firm competing in the railroad industry.  
When firms diversify away from their core industries, they often choose to 
change their names to create a new corporate image which reflects their broader focus 
(Argenti, Hansen, and Neslin 1987; Boddewyn 1966; Bosch and Hirschey 1989; Ferris 
1988; Glynn and Abzug 2002; Howe 1982; Morris and Reyes 1991). The changes by RJ 
Reynolds Tobacco to RJ Reynolds Industries, Standard Press Steel to SPS Technologies, 
US Steel to USX, and United Aircraft to United Technologies are examples of CNCs 
related to firms’ decreased affiliation with an industry. The consulting divisions of 
accounting firms that were trying to disassociate themselves from the Arthur Andersen 
accounting scandal by making major changes from PriceWaterhouseCoopers to Monday 
and KPMG Consulting to BearingPoint provide more recent examples of CNCs due to 
decreased industry affiliation. 
Affiliation with a particular brand or business unit. Serving as an interesting 
contrast to the firms that change their name to broaden their focus are the firms that want 
to return to familiar brand names and descriptive words as many firms did in the 1990s 
(Glynn and Abzug 2002). Garbett (1988) predicted the need for this retrenchment while 
asserting that as a result of firms’ diversification, many names fail to serve their 
principal function of communicating the business in which the firm competes. Garbett 
(1988) also argued that if a firm is small enough and sufficiently well focused, its name 
should specify the firm’s competency. An example of a firm that tried to erase its 
industry affiliation only to refocus on its primary brand is American Sugar Co., which 
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changed its name to Amstar and later renamed itself again as Domino Sugar Co. An 
example of a firm emphasizing a particular business unit is Dayton-Hudson’s change to 
Target. 
Affiliation with a negative event or product attribute(s). An antecedent not 
previously specified by researchers of CNCs is a firm’s affiliation with a negative event 
or product attribute. The CNCs by the surviving divisions of Enron to CrossCountry 
Energy Corporation and Primsa Energy International (Alsop 2004) are examples of the 
former. In addition, a previous CNC can serve as the negative event and prompt the firm 
to revert to its original name as did United Airlines’ parent company UAL after its 
change to Allegis (Kohli and Hemnes 1995).  Although it is the name of a division rather 
than a corporate name, Kentucky Fried Chicken changed to KFC in order to de-
emphasize its association with the attribute of fried food.  
Affiliation with a geographic region. Some firms choose to change their corporate names 
because they want to reduce the impression that they are regional firms. Standard Oil of 
Ohio’s change to Standard Oil is an example. Garbett (1988) argued that a geographic 
CNC is only necessary for a firm in certain industries such as railroads and banking, 
while firms in other industries such as liquor and tools would not require such a change.  
In addition, international expansion can prompt firms to change their names, as 
was the case with TSI’s change to Syniverse (Dano 2004). Boddewyn (1966) noted that 
global corporations should select names that are pronounceable in any language and free 
from any bad connotation in foreign languages. Morris and Reyes (1991) added that 
corporations might change their names to prevent unattractive phonetic sounds or 
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spelling arrangements in international markets. Although they were not changed, 
examples of difficult names to pronounce include Au Bon Pain bakeries, Purolator 
Courier delivery service, Jhirmack shampoo, Orangina soft drink, and Germaine Monteil 
cosmetics (Alsop 1987). 
The corporate name can provide clarity and focus for the organization’s 
leadership (Aaker 2004: 93). A well conceived corporate name “instantly sets the image 
positioning” for the firm’s product and brands in the marketplace (Delano 2001: 44). 
From the perspective of the company’s leadership, the corporate identity is often 
captured in the corporate name, which represents the essence of the new product, service 
experience, or business venture (Delano 2001). Organizational identity relates to the 
mental associations that organizational members have toward their company (Brown, 
Dacin, Pratt, and Whetten 2006).  
Previous researchers have established that superior performance can result from a 
favorable corporate image or favorable corporate identity, which in turn has been linked 
to a favorable corporate reputation. For example, Margulies (1977) suggested that a 
positive relationship exists between well-designed corporate identity programs and sales. 
In addition, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) documented evidence of the link between 
business reputation and historical performance. Finally, Bharadwaj and Menon (1993) 
utilized the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) database to investigate the 
determinants of success in service industries and concluded that corporate reputation and 
service image can increase market share and reduce business risk.  
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 A favorable corporate image can also increase stakeholder commitment and 
loyalty (Simões, Dibb, and Fisk 2005) by improving the attitudes of corporate suppliers 
(Brown 1995), achieving higher levels of commitment among employees (Gray and 
Smeltzer 1987) and fortifying the company’s ability to recruit new staff (Balmer 2003; 
Gatewood, Gowan, and Lautenschlager 1993), investors (Balmer 2003; Fombrun and 
Shanley 1990), and joint venture partners (Barney and Hansen 1994). Hence, a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image is expected to have a positive impact upon a 
firm’s stock price. 
Hypothesis 1: On average, a CNC related to a change in corporate image will    
           have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price. 
 
CNC related to a change in corporate entity. Firms often change their names 
after the emergence of a new corporate entity (Argenti, Hansen, and Neslin 1987; 
Boddewyn 1966; Bosch and Hirschey 1989; Ferris 1988; Glynn and Abzug 2002; Howe 
1982; Koku 1997; Morris and Reyes 1991). For the purpose of this dissertation, a CNC 
related to a change in corporate entity is operationalized as a CNC that occurs less than 
one year after a merger, acquisition, divestiture, reorganization, or change in ownership. 
Although mergers first appeared in the U.S. during the early 1900s, this type of change 
was perhaps most common during the 1980s, a decade filled with takeovers, the 
restructuring of firms and industries, mergers and acquisitions, and banking deregulation 
(Glynn and Abzug 2002). Examples of CNCs that resulted from acquisitions include 
AOL and Time Warner to AOL Time Warner, Exxon and Mobil to ExxonMobil, 
General Cinema Corporation and Harcourt Brace to Harcourt General, and Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand to PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  
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 It is possible that a CNC related to a change in corporate entity provides 
additional information about the merged company. For example, when Sandoz and Ciba-
Geigy chose the name Novartis, the merged company was signaling a fundamental 
change in its direction (Du Bois 2001). However, it is expected that the effect on a firm’s 
stock price of a CNC related to a change in corporate entity should be mostly captured at 
the time of the announcement of the change in corporate entity.  
Major versus Minor Changes to the Corporate Name during a CNC Related to a 
Change in Corporate Image 
For the purpose of this dissertation, a major CNC is operationalized as a CNC 
which creates a new corporate name that is not immediately recognizable as related to 
the previous corporate name (e.g., Dayton-Hudson to Target). In contrast, a minor CNC 
is operationalized as a CNC which creates a new corporate name that is immediately 
recognizable as related to the previous corporate name (e.g., US Air to US Airways). In 
sum, these operationalizations do not reflect the degree of change in the firm’s 
operations, but rather reflect the degree of change to the corporate name itself. 
 Previous researchers of information processing have suggested that inconsistent 
information will increase the recipients’ motivation to process the information (see 
Sengupta and Johar 1992). Since a major CNC will likely be perceived as inconsistent 
information, it will increase customers’ motivation to process the information. If the 
CNC can create a more favorable corporate image among customers, then the additional 
processing of this information may lead to a more permanent change in their attitude 
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toward the firm, especially if the information is processed via the central route (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).  
Previous researchers have also found that the greater the dissimilarity between a 
sponsor brand and comparison brands in an advertisement, the greater the elaboration 
when comparing them (see Priester, Godek, Nayakankuppum, and Park 2004). 
Extending this logic to CNCs, the greater the dissimilarity between the new corporate 
name and former corporate name, the greater the elaboration when comparing the new 
name to the former name. Hence, as compared to a minor change, a major change to the 
corporate name requires additional elaboration by customers. 
Some of the previous researchers have reached similar conclusions about major 
and minor change to the corporate name. For example, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) 
concluded that a firm intends to strengthen the firm’s appeal to consumers when it 
undergoes a major change to the corporate name, whereas a minor change to the 
corporate name would not likely have much influence upon consumers’ preferences. In 
addition, other researchers found that firms that changed their name to a .com name 
during the Internet boom period (i.e., pre-August 2000) as well as firms that removed the 
.com from their name during the Internet bust period (i.e., post-August 2000) realized 
large gains in shareholder wealth associated with the CNC. Moreover, the gains were 
greater for major change than for minor change in the corporate name (Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004).  
Other researchers of CNCs, however, have not found major changes to the 
corporate name to have a greater effect upon a firm’s stock price than minor changes. 
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For example, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) concluded that the effect of a CNC on 
stock price is not influenced by whether the change to the corporate name was major or 
minor. In addition, the announcement of a major change to the corporate name might 
positively affect customers’ reception (i.e., acknowledging the new corporate name), but 
might have a negative affect on yielding (i.e., choosing to purchase from the firm) due to 
the substantial risk about the firm’s future that the new name introduces (Bosch and 
Hirschey 1989). This may help explain Bosch and Hirschey’s (1989) finding of a modest 
positive valuation effect for minor change to the corporate name during the eleven 
business day pre-announcement period (i.e., the ten business days prior to the event and 
the event date itself), which dissipated during the ten business day post-announcement 
period, and a statistically insignificant effect for major changes to the corporate name.  
This may also be because it is arguable that both major and minor changes to the 
corporate name provide information. For example, the change from Echlin Mfg. to 
Echlin may be signaling that Echlin intended to engage in other activities besides 
manufacturing. In addition, the change from Paine Webber to Paine Webber Group 
signals an expansion or reorganization of the firm. Finally, the change from Bic Pen to 
Bic signaled its diversification into plastic products other than pens.  Moreover, firms 
may be prevented from utilizing the CNC to convey positive information that is 
incomplete, complex, or too sensitive to divulge (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987). 
Aaker (2004) concluded that a CNC is a last resort. Supporting this conclusion is 
Garbett’s (1988) report of the results of a survey by the New York communications and 
design firm, Lubliner Saltz, which showed that seventy-two percent of managers believe 
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that major changes to the corporate name should be considered only if there are no other 
alternatives. Although the change can be well perceived when it is connected to the past 
(Delattre 2002), major changes are often strongly opposed by shareholders. For example, 
Guinness’ shareholders strongly opposed the newly selected name, Diageo, during the 
merger with Grand Metropolitan (Balmer and Dinnie 1999).  
A final argument against major changes to the corporate name was advanced by 
Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987), who pointed out the risk inherent in a major CNC of 
losing some of the goodwill in the form of name recognition, company image, and 
routine purchase behavior by customers. Moreover, this loss of goodwill could cause a 
downward shift in the demand curve and result in lower revenues (Karbhari, Sori, and 
Mohamad 2004). 
In summary, a minor CNC related to a change in corporate image will likely have 
little effect on customers’ opinions of the firm’s corporate image. In contrast, if a major 
CNC related to a change in corporate image can overcome the loss of the previous 
corporate name’s goodwill and cause customers to construe the firm’s corporate image 
more favorably, then it will likely have a positive effect on the firm’s stock price. Thus, 
given the previously discussed link between corporate image and performance, it is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: On average, a major change to the corporate name during a CNC  
      related to a change in corporate image will  
                              have a positive effect upon a firm’s stock price. 
 
Hypothesis 3: On average, a minor change to the corporate name will have a  
lesser effect on a firm’s stock price than a major change to the 
corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate 
image.  
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Brand Name Altering versus Non-Brand Name Altering CNCs 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, a brand name altering CNC is 
operationalized as a CNC which results in a change in one or more of the brand names 
facing the customer. This can occur when the CNC rebrands an existing product line 
with a new name (e.g., Software Technologies Corp. to SeeBeyond), creates a new name 
for a new product line (e.g., Rocking Horse Child Care to Nobel Education Dynamics), 
or accomplishes both (e.g., Etinuum to Digital Lighthouse). It has been argued that firms 
may be better off reviving brands rather than making the large capital investment 
required to build new brand image (Bellman 2005). There are inherent risks in a CNC 
since the previous name usually has generated some goodwill. Specifically, a brand 
name altering CNC can result in the loss of brand awareness and the loss of brand 
heritage (e.g., PriceWaterhouseCoopers Consulting to Monday; GTE and Bell Atlantic 
to Verizon). 
Loss of brand awareness. It is generally accepted that brand awareness is 
positively related to a favorable brand image (Bernstein 1984; Boyle 1996; Kennedy 
1977; Olins 1989). In addition, it is well documented that consumers choose well-known 
brands as a risk-reducing strategy (Capon and Burke 1980; de Chernatony 1989; Dunn, 
Murphy, and Skelly 1986; Fowler 1982; Granzin 1981; Guseman 1981; Mitchell and 
Greatorex 1989; Mitchell and McGoldrick 1996; Moore and Lehmann 1980; Perry and 
Perry 1976; Roselius 1971; Taylor and Rao 1982; Toh and Heeren 1982; Tootelian, 
Gaedeke, and Schlacter 1988; Wu, Holmes, and Alexander 1984). Although examined 
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less frequently, well-known brands are also used by industrial customers to reduce risk 
(Cardozo and Cagley 1971; Hawes and Barnhouse 1987; Mitchell 1989). 
As mentioned previously, when a firm undergoes a brand name altering CNC, it 
may choose to create an entirely new brand name as Starmark Inc. did when it changed 
its name to Babystar Inc. and launched a new line of inflatable juvenile travel products 
under the Babystar brand rather than the Starmark brand. A brand name altering CNC 
can also occur when a firm adopts the brand name of a company it acquires as was the 
case with the change from Fidelity Medical Inc. to Corniche Group Inc. after Fidelity 
acquired the Corniche brand of stationery. In either case, brand name altering CNCs 
sacrifice the goodwill generated by the previous name in the form of brand awareness, 
company image, and customer loyalty (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987). Moreover, the 
loss of this goodwill can decrease demand for the brand and reduce the firm’s revenues 
(Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004). 
Loss of brand heritage. Struggling corporate brands can benefit from returning to 
their roots and identifying what made them successful in the first place (Aaker 2004). 
Trying to disassociate a firm from its heritage, however, is a much riskier proposition. 
For example, the British media accused British Telecom, British Petroleum, and British 
Gas of cultural blasphemy when they deleted “British” from their names (Kaikati and 
Kaikati 2003) and changed to BT, BP, and Centrica, respectively. In addition, UAL 
abandoned its United Airlines heritage when it changed it name to Allegis but 
subsequently returned to it by changing back to UAL. Wunderman Cato attempted a 
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similar move when the advertising agency rebranded itself as Impiric before reverting to 
the Wunderman name. 
In contrast, a brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate image 
can serve as an effective replacement of: 1) the corporate name of a firm that has low 
market share with current products branded with the corporate name and competes in a 
high growth industry, an industry with low brand loyalty and low switching costs, or an 
industry where competitors have relatively small marketing budgets; or 2) the corporate 
name of a firm that wants to overcome negative perceptions of an industry (e.g., U.S. 
Steel to USX), a product attribute (e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken to KFC), or an event 
(e.g., WorldCom to MCI). 
A successful corporate identity has been described as a “living” identity that 
accurately represents an organization and its aspirations even as it changes over time 
(Topalian 2003). A CNC can help maintain this accurate representation, but customers’ 
desire for consistency (Gardner and Levy 1955; Park, Jaworski, and McInnis 1986) 
makes it inadvisable for a firm to change one of its brand names (Kohli and Leuthesser 
2001) unless extensive marketing of the new brand name can eventually generate a level 
of awareness that exceeds that which was achieved by the previous name. In order to do 
so, the CNC would have to vastly improve the brand’s meaningfulness (i.e., relevance to 
the product category) (Berry, Lefkowith, and Clark 1986; Kanungo and Dutta 1966; 
Kohli, Harich, and Leuthesser 2005; McNeal and Zeren 1981; Misra and Jain 1971; 
Morris and Reyes 1991), likeability (Keller 2003: 177, 218), memorability, 
distinctiveness, and flexibility (Berry, Lefkowith, and Clark 1987; Keller 2003; McNeal 
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and Zeren 1981; Morris and Reyes 1991). Examples of brand name altering CNCs that 
have arguably accomplished this include Blue Ribbon Sports to Nike and Andersen 
Consulting to Accenture.  
In contrast, a non-brand name altering CNC, such as Dayton-Hudson to Target, 
United Aircraft to United Technologies, or Consolidated Foods to Sara Lee, can serve as 
an effective replacement of an outdated corporate name that no longer describes the 
business well while having no negative impact on the awareness of the firm’s brands. In 
doing so, firms still need to take special care in selecting the new name in order to avoid 
having to revert to the original name (e.g., UAL to Allegis to UAL) or change it again 
(e.g., Woolworth to Venator to Foot Locker).  
Overall, due to the difficulty of overcoming the resulting loss of brand awareness 
and brand heritage, a firm may be better served by using a CNC to signal other changes 
that are occurring in the firm or to replace an outdated corporate name (see Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 1987; Koku 1997) without altering the brand names facing its customers. 
Hence: 
Hypothesis 4: On average, a non-brand name altering CNC will have a positive  
effect upon the firm’s stock price. 
  
Hypothesis 5: On average, a brand name altering CNC will have a lesser effect  
upon the firm’s stock price than a non-brand name altering CNC. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Empirical Context and Data 
 To conduct the hypotheses tests, the following steps were taken: 1) a 
comprehensive sample of CNC announcements was compiled; 2) objective measures of 
CNCs related to a change in corporate entity versus a change in corporate image, major 
versus minor change to corporate name, and brand name altering versus non-brand name 
altering CNCs were created; 3) the financial value of CNCs was measured at the time a 
CNC is announced; and 4) a context with adequate variation in resources across firms 
was used to permit comparisons of CNCs across firms (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 
2003). 
To compile the comprehensive sample of firms which had publicly announced a 
CNC between 1987 and 2002, a search on Lexis Nexis was performed.  Specifically, a 
“guided news search” of the “business and finance news source” within the “business” 
category of the Lexis Nexis Academic database was conducted with the key words 
“name change” in order to compile the names of the firms listed on the American Stock 
Exchange (ASE), NASDAQ, and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and match them 
to their identifying information with Wharton Research Data Services’ (WRDS) Center 
for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP). This identified 814 CNC announcements that 
were made during the period of 1987 to 2002.  
To define the criteria for inclusion of a particular CNC announcement in the 
sample, several steps were taken.  First, another “guided news search” on Lexis Nexis 
was conducted during the year preceding the CNC with the new corporate name as a key 
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word to ensure that the new corporate name had not been divulged publicly prior to the 
CNC announcement. Next, another “guided news search” on Lexis Nexis was conducted 
to ensure that no other announcements were made during the seven business day event 
window surrounding the CNC announcement. Firms which made concurrent 
announcements were not analyzed because the analysis would be compromised by the 
multiple treatment effect comprised of the CNC’s effect on stock price and the separate 
effect on the firm’s stock price of the other announcements (e.g., acquisition, new 
product announcement, earnings, dividends, etc.).  
After removing those CNC announcements which were made with other 
concurrent announcements, the sample was reduced from 814 to 183 CNCs between 
1987 and 2002. Fortunately, the size of this reduced sample still permitted analysis of 
hypotheses (e.g., brand name altering versus non-brand name altering) that had not been 
considered by previous researchers perhaps due to insufficient sample size. 
Event Study 
Following the lead of other researchers of CNCs (e.g., Bosch and Hirschey 1989; 
Ferris 1988; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Lee 2001; Madura and Tucker 1990; 
Morris and Reyes 1991), this dissertation adopts the event study methodology from the 
modern theory of finance to analyze the effect of CNCs on the behavior of stock prices. 
A stock price reflects the time- and risk-discounted present value of future cash 
flows which are expected to accrue to the firm (Rappaport 1997; Srinivasan and 
Bharadwaj 2004) and, according to the semistrong efficient markets/rational 
expectations hypothesis (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985; Fama 1970; Fama and French 
   100
1990; Muth 1961), reflects all publicly available information. As a result, this 
dissertation measures the impact of a firm’s first CNC announcement because only a 
CNC announcement which was unanticipated by investors should cause a change in the 
firm’s stock price. Moreover, it should occur as soon as the market learns of the change, 
and the magnitude of the change should serve as an unbiased estimate of the value of 
changes to the firm’s expected cash flows (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Schwert 
1981; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). 
There are five steps to conducting an event study including: 1) identifying the 
event, 2) defining the criteria for including a particular event in the sample, 3) 
calculating normal and abnormal returns, 4) estimating the normal performance model, 
and 5) performing statistical and hypotheses tests (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004). 
The magnitude of the effect of asset prices depends on the time pattern of regulatory 
effects on future cash flows and on the discount rate.  For example, let Pit, the price of 
asset i, be the discounted value of the future cash flows which are expected to accrue to 
the asset: 
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where dit+k is the cash flow to asset i which is expected to occur in period t+k and rit is 
the discount rate, the opportunity cost of the cash flow given its perceived risk, which is 
assumed to be constant (Schwert 1981). 
Suppose that the future discounted cash flows to the asset are affected by a CNC.  
The price of the asset will change by the present value of the changes in the expected 
future cash flows: 
 
 
 
 
where P*it is the equilibrium price after the CNC and d*it+k is the expected cash flow 
after the CNC (Schwert 1981).  
According to Schwert (1981), the price change in (2) will be larger: (a) the 
sooner the CNC affects profitability, and (b) the longer the period over which the CNC 
is expected to affect profitability. Thus, a CNC that has a permanent effect on 
profitability will result in a magnified change in asset prices and a CNC that only affects 
profitability in the distant future will have very little impact on asset prices if the 
discount rate is sufficiently large (Schwert 1981). To estimate the effects of 
unanticipated CNCs it is necessary to measure the change in stock prices before and 
after the CNC.  Unlike the stylized example in (2), the before and after stock prices, P 
and P*, cannot be measured at the same time.  Instead, the effect of the CNC is 
estimated by comparing the stock return over the measurement interval 
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with a "normal" return to the stock price relative to the before-regulation stock price  
(Schwert 1981).  
Dependent Variable 
 To measure the stock price effect of CNCs, the dependent variable used in this 
dissertation is the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) during event window of 
three business days (-1, +1) surrounding the first announcement of an intended or 
completed CNC. CARs are defined as the sum of a firm’s daily percentage stock price 
changes after adjusting for general stock market movements and the firm’s systematic 
risk, for each day in an event window (Das, Sen, and Sengupta 1998; Park and Mezias 
2005; Reuer 2001). The three business day event window was selected to account for 
any information leakage during the business day preceding the CNC announcement and 
the possibility that it takes an additional business day after the day of the announcement 
for some investors to learn that the CNC has taken place. The use of a short event 
window is supported by previous researchers who have found that they accurately 
estimate stock market reaction to events even during anomalies such as stock market 
crashes (Fama 1998; Park and Mezias 2005). This three business day period was also 
used as a primary event window by several other event studies (Chaney, Devinney, and 
Winer 1991; Clark, Cornwell, and Pruitt 2002; Cornwell, Pruitt, and Clark 2005; 
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Gorman, Grenlee, and Speh 2005; Harawa 1992; Jarell and Peltzman 1985; Lee 2001).  
Among the researchers who examined the daily returns for up to fourteen business days 
before (Morris and Reyes 1991) and ten business days after (Karbhari, Sori, and 
Mohamad 2004) the event, several of them (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995; Hendricks 
and Singhal 1997; Hozier and Schatzberg 2000; Mathur and Mathur 1995; Mathur and 
Mathur 1996; Mathur and Mathur 2000; Mishra and Bhabra 2001) elected to use a 
primary event window of (-1, 0), some of them (Bobinski and Ramirez 1994; Geyskens, 
Geilens, and Dekimpe 2002; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Lane and Jacobson 1995; 
Mathur, Mathur, and Rangan 1998) chose (0, +1) as their primary event window and still 
others (Bosch and Hirschey 1989; Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, and Rau 2004; Kim and Morris 2003; Kulkarni, Vora, and Brown 2003) 
examined only day 0 as their primary event window. Without question, these event 
studies represent an improvement over the initial event studies (Eddy and Saunders 
1980; Howe 1982) that used cumulative weekly stock price returns to examine their 
events.  Nevertheless, it is argued here that utilizing a three business day window is not 
only appropriate, but also conservative in that it would be more difficult to show 
statistically significant stock price effects over a three business day window than a one 
or two business day event window.   
Independent Variables 
For the purposes of conducting the hypotheses tests, the press releases 
announcing the CNCs were collected and the CNCs were classified according to their 
antecedents (i.e., change in corporate image versus change in corporate entity), the 
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degree of change in the corporate name (i.e., major versus minor), and whether any of 
the firm’s brands were altered as a result of the CNC. If the press release announcing the 
CNC did not provide sufficient information to make these classifications, additional 
information was collected from other press releases that were unrelated to the CNC 
during the year preceding the CNC announcement. In addition, to confirm whether a 
CNC altered one of the brand names in the firm's portfolio, the firms’ annual reports 
from the year preceding and the year following the CNC announcement were collected 
from the SEC File microfiche database compiled by Q-Data and the EDGAR database 
compiled online by Mergent. The annual reports were then reviewed to identify the 
brands possessed by the firm both before and after the CNC. 
To ensure the proper classification of CNC announcements according the 
antecedents of CNCs, another “guided news search” on Lexis Nexis was conducted in 
order to review the firm’s press releases during the year preceding the CNC and 
determine whether the CNC was related to a change in corporate entity not mentioned 
during the event window. When all of these efforts still did not provide sufficient 
information to classify the antecedents for a specific hypothesis, the firms were dropped 
from the subsample (e.g., brand name altering CNC announcements) analyzed for that 
hypothesis.  
To ensure that the degree of change to the corporate name was objectively 
measured, three judges reviewed each of the pairs of corporate names and rated them 
with the following scale: 1) New name is highly recognizable as related to previous 
name. I am 80% to 100% sure they're the same company (e.g., Intervoice Brite to 
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Intervoice); 2) New name is moderately recognizable as related to previous name. I’m 
60 to 80% sure they're the same company (e.g., Healthdyne Information Enterprises to 
HI Enterprises); 3) New name is neither recognizable nor unrecognizable as related to 
previous name. I’m 40 to 60% sure they're the same company (e.g., Healthdyne 
Information Enterprises to HIE); 4) New name is moderately unrecognizable as related 
to previous name. I’m 20 to 40% sure they're the same company (e.g., Professional 
Detailing to PDI Inc.); 5) New name is highly unrecognizable as related to previous 
name. I’m 0 to 20% sure they're the same company (e.g., Dayton-Hudson to Target). In 
addition, when the CNC incorporated the adoption of an acronym, the judges followed 
the following guidelines. Acronyms that maintain the exact order of the initials as well 
as one or more of the initial words comprising the acronym (e.g., Healthdyne 
Information Enterprises to HI Enterprises) were rated with a 2. Acronyms that maintain 
the exact order of the initials (e.g., Healthdyne Information Enterprises to HIE) were 
rated with a 3. Acronyms that add one or more letters to the acronym (e.g., Professional 
Detailing to PDI Inc.) were rated with a 4. 
All three judges identically rated 136 of the 183 pairs of corporate names.  Then 
after further discussion, the three raters were able to reach a consensus rating on the 
remaining 47 pairs of corporate names.  Finally, the pairs of corporate names that were 
rated with a 1 or 2 were classified as minor changes to the corporate name, the pairs of 
corporate names that were rated with a 4 or 5 were classified as major changes to the 
corporate name, and the pairs of corporate names that were rated a 3 were classified as 
neutral changes to the corporate name. This ultimately resulted in two pairs of corporate 
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names being dropped from the subsample for the hypothesis examining the difference 
between minor and major changes to the corporate name during a CNC related to a 
change in corporate image. 
Efforts to Overcome Methodological Limitations of Previous Event Studies 
By examining CNCs between 1987 and 2002, this dissertation has overcome a 
majority of the methodological limitations that were encountered by previous 
researchers of CNCs. 
Noise. As discussed previously, although Brown and Warner’s (1985) simulation 
found simultaneous events to have a statistically insignificant average effect on firms’ 
stock prices, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have argued that confounding events can 
contribute to the noise in stock prices, make it difficult to isolate the stock price of an 
event, and should be removed from the sample. To address this potential limitation, 
McWilliams and Siegel’s (1997) more conservative approach is adopted by this 
dissertation. Thus, firms which made concurrent announcements of financially relevant 
events during the seven business days surrounding the event were removed from the 
sample. 
Event date is not easily identified. If the date of the event (i.e., the first date at 
which the occurrence of the CNC became publicly known) was not easily identifiable, 
the firms were removed from the sample. For example, CNCs that were first reported in 
a monthly or bi-weekly magazine were not included.  
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Events may cluster. The sample was checked to confirm that clustering of CNC 
announcements on particular dates was not an issue. Hence, there was no need to 
estimate CNCs simultaneously in order to avoid covariance between their errors. 
Sample size. Although the conservative decision to remove firms with concurrent 
announcements during the seven business day window surrounding the CNC drastically 
reduced the size of the sample from 814 to 183 firms, it was still large enough to conduct 
the subsample analyses to test each of the hypotheses. 
Generalizability. Unlike with event studies which focus on a particularly 
industry, generalizability is a strength, rather than a limitation, of this dissertation. The 
sample is comprised of CNC announcements by publicly traded firms from a wide 
variety of industries, including industrial and consumer firms, manufacturers and service 
providers, as well as large firms and relatively small firms.  
 .  
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RESULTS 
To test the hypotheses, t-tests have been conducted to determine whether the 
difference between the hypothesized stock price effects and zero are statistically 
significant during the three business day event window (-1, +1) surrounding the CNC 
announcement.  
Antecedents of Corporate Name Changes  
Change in corporate image. Hypothesis 1 posited that a CNC related to a change 
in corporate image will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price.  This 
hypothesis was supported within the event window (-1, +1) with a mean CAR of 2.20%, 
a t-value of 2.34, and a p-value of .021. 
 Change in corporate entity. In addition, although the null hypothesis was not 
offered, it was expected that a CNC related to a change in corporate entity should have a 
statistically insignificant effect on stock price because the stock price effect is mostly 
captured at the time of the announcement of the change in corporate entity. This 
expectation was confirmed within the event window (-1, +1) with a mean CAR of 
0.31%, a t-value of 0.27, and a p-value of .7863. 
Major versus Minor Change to a Corporate Name during a CNC Related to a 
Change in Corporate Image  
Hypothesis 2 posited that, on average, a major change to the corporate name 
during a CNC related to a change in corporate image will have a positive effect upon a 
firm’s stock price. This hypothesis was supported within the event window (-1, +1) with 
a mean CAR of 2.87%, a t-value of 2.20, and a p-value of .0304. 
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Hypothesis 3 posited that, on average, a minor change to the corporate name will 
have a lesser effect on a firm’s stock price than a major change to the corporate name 
during a CNC related to a change in corporate image. This hypothesis was not supported 
during the event window of (-1, +1), with a mean CAR of 2.1%, a t-value of 1.25, and p-
value of 0.2146. 
In summary, a major change to the corporate name during a CNC is, on average, 
statistically significant and positive, whereas a minor change to the corporate name 
during a CNC is, on average, statistically insignificant. However, the difference between 
the two is statistically insignificant.  
Brand Name Altering versus Non-Brand Name Altering CNCs   
Hypothesis 4 posited that, on average, a non-brand name altering CNC will have 
a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price.  This hypothesis was not supported 
although it approached statistical significance with a mean CAR of 2.14%, a t-value of 
1.77, and a p-value of .0801. 
Hypothesis 5 posited that, on average, a brand name altering CNC will have a 
lesser effect upon the firms’ stock price than a non-brand name altering CNC.  With a 
mean difference in the CARs of -0.16%, a t-value of -.08, and a p-value of .9372, this 
hypothesis was not supported. In summary, a non-brand name altering CNC, on average, 
approaches statistical significance whereas a brand altering CNC is, on average, 
statistically insignificant. However, the difference between a non-brand name altering 
and a brand name altering CNC is statistically insignificant. 
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Robustness Checks 
CNC event studies often conduct robustness checks of the event window used to 
measure the stock price effect. To test the robustness of the stock price effect during the 
three business day event window, analyses of the stock price effect during five and seven 
business day event windows were performed. In the event that information is 
incorporated in the stock price more than one business day prior to the CNC 
announcement, the effect will decrease the difference in returns attributed to the CNC.  
Thus, the three business day event window provides a conservative measure of the effect 
of CNCs because it underestimates the impact of the effect of CNC compared to larger 
event windows of five to seven business days. (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). 
Hypothesis 1, which posited that a CNC related to a change in corporate image 
will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price approached statistical significance 
in the five business day window (-2, +2) and fully supported in the seven business day 
window (-3, +3).  In the five business day window, hypothesis 1 had a mean CAR of 
2.08%, a t-value of 1.94, and a p-value of .0551.  In the seven business day window, the 
mean CAR was 2.73% with a t-value of 2.40 and a p-value of .0179. 
Hypothesis 2, which posited that, on average, a major change to the corporate 
name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image will have a positive effect 
upon a firm’s stock price approached statistical significance in the five business day 
window (-2, +2) and was fully supported in the seven business day window (-3, +3).  In 
the five business day window, the mean CAR was 2.91% with a t-value of 1.96 and a  
p-value of .0533. In the seven business day window, the mean CAR was 3.27% with a 
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t-value of 2.15 and a p-value of .0347. 
Hypothesis 3, which posited that, on average, a minor change to the corporate 
name will have less of an effect on a firm’s stock price than a major change to the 
corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image was not supported 
on either the five or seven business day window.  In the five business day window, it 
returned a mean CAR of 2.55%, a t-value of 1.32, and a p-value of .1903. In the seven 
business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 1.97%, a t-value of 0.91 and a p-value 
of .3645. 
Hypothesis 4, which posited that, on average, a non-brand name altering CNC 
will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price approached statistical significance 
in the five business day window (-2, +2) and fully supported in the seven business day 
window (-3, +3).  In the five business day window, hypothesis 4 had a mean CAR of 
.0281 with a t-value of 1.78 and a p-value of .0554.  In the seven business day window, 
it had a mean CAR of 3.64% with a t-value of 2.5 and a p-value of .0145. 
Hypothesis 5 which posited that, on average, a brand name altering CNC will 
have a lesser effect upon the firms’ stock price than a non-brand name altering CNC was 
not supported on either the five or seven business day window.  On the five business day 
window, it returned a mean of 1.7% with a t-value of 0.81 and a p-value of .4189.  On 
the seven business day window, it had a mean of 2.6%, a t-value of 1.08, and a p-value 
of .2800. 
In addition, other robustness tests were performed to account for the effect of 
outliers. Hypothesis 1, which posited that a CNC related to a change in corporate image 
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will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price was supported in the three 
business day window (-1, +1), approached statistical significance in the five business 
day window (-2, +2), and was fully supported in the seven business day window  
(-3, +3). In the three business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 1.23%, a t-value 
of 2.52, and a p-value of .0133. In the five business day window, hypothesis 1 had a 
mean of .69% and a t-value of 1.05 and a p-value of .2948. In the seven business day 
window, the mean was 1.46% with a t-value of 1.67 and a p-value of .0978 
Hypothesis 2, which posited that, on average, a major change to the corporate 
name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image will have a positive effect 
upon a firm’s stock price was fully supported in the three business day window (-1, +1), 
not supported in the five business day window (-2, +2) and fully supported in the seven 
business day window (-3, +3).  In the three business day window, it had a mean CAR of 
1.55%, a t-value of 2.31, and a p-value of .0238.  In the five business day window, the 
mean was 0.92% with a t-value of 0.98.  It had a p-value of .3323.  In the seven business 
day window, the mean CAR was 1.57% with a t-value of 1.27 and a p-value of .2074. 
Hypothesis 3 posited that, on average, a minor change to the corporate name will 
have less of an effect on a firm’s stock price than a major change to the corporate name 
during a CNC related to a change in corporate image was not supported on the three 
business day window, the five business day window, or the seven business day window.  
On the three business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 0.96%, a t-value of 1.02, 
and a p-value of .3107.  On the five business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 
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0.68% and a t-value of 0.58 with a p-value of .5649.  On the seven business day window, 
it returned a mean CAR of 0.62% with a t-value of 0.39 and a p-value of .6951. 
Hypothesis 4, which posited that, on average, a non-brand name altering CNC 
will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price, was not supported on the three 
business day window, the five business day window, or the seven business day window.  
On the three business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 0.78%, a t-value of 1.23, 
and a p-value of .2242.  On the five business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 
0.51% and a t-value of 0.59 with a p-value of .5548.  On the seven business day window, 
it returned a mean CAR of 1.57% with a t-value of 1.44 and a p-value of .1537. 
Hypothesis 5 which posited that, on average, a brand name altering CNC will 
have a lesser effect upon the firms’ stock price than a non-brand name altering CNC was 
not supported the three business day window, the five business day window, or the seven 
business day window.  On the three business day window, it returned a mean CAR of -
1.23 %, a t-value of -1.2, and a p-value of .2342.  On the five business day window, it 
returned a mean CAR of -0.2% and a t-value of -.14 with a p-value of .8865.  On the 
seven business day window, it returned a mean CAR of 0.4% with a t-value of 0.22 and 
a p-value of .8254. 
The complete results of the stock price effect of corporate name changes can be 
found on Table 5. Table 6 then outlines the effects of outliers on the data by removing 
them from the data set then re-calculating the data to see if the results still hold true. 
Finally, Table 7 summarizes the results of several other event studies and affirms that the 
three business day period was frequently used as a primary event window. 
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 TABLE 5 
RESULTS: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECT OF CORPORATE NAME CHANGES 
Hypo-
thesis 
I.V. D.V. N Mean Standard Deviation 
t-
Value 
Prob 
> |t| 
Lower 
CL 
Mean 
Upper 
CL 
Mean 
Notes 
H1 
Change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
129 
0.0220 
0.0208 
0.0273 
0.1067 
0.1220 
0.1291 
2.34 
1.94 
2.40 
0.0210 
0.0551 
0.0179 
0.0034 
-0.00046 
0.0048 
0.0406 
0.0421 
0.0498 
Supported 
Part Supp 
Supported 
 
Change in 
corporate 
entity 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
54 
0.0031 
-0.006 
-0.021 
0.0824 
0.0821 
0.0769 
0.27 
-0.54 
-1.97 
0.7863 
0.5923 
0.0540 
-0.019 
-0.028 
-0.042 
0.0255 
0.0164 
0.0004 
 
H2 
Major CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
87 
0.0287 
0.0291 
0.0327 
0.1214 
0.1383 
0.1424 
2.20 
1.96 
2.15 
0.0304 
0.0533 
0.0347 
0.0028 
-0.00042 
0.0024 
0.0545 
0.0585 
0.0631 
Supported 
Part Supp 
Supported 
 
Minor CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
40 
0.0076 
0.0035 
0.0131 
0.0676 
0.0789 
0.0965 
0.71 
0.28 
0.86 
0.4795 
0.7782 
0.3958 
-0.014 
-0.022 
-0.018 
0.0293 
0.0288 
0.0439 
 
H3 
Difference 
between 
Major and 
Minor CNC 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
 
0.0210 
0.0255 
0.0197 
0.1075 
0.1229 
0.1298 
1.25 
1.32 
0.91 
0.2146 
0.1903 
0.3645 
-0.020 
-0.021 
-0.029 
0.0617 
0.0720 
0.0687 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
H4 
Non-brand 
name 
altering CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
82 
0.0214 
0.0281 
0.0364 
0.1093 
0.1330 
0.1320 
1.77 
1.78 
2.50 
0.0801 
0.0554 
0.0145 
-0.003 
-0.003 
0.0074 
0.0454 
0.0553 
0.0654 
Part Supp 
Part Supp 
Supported 
 
Brand name 
altering CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
45 
0.0230 
0.0090 
0.0103 
0.1049 
0.1009 
0.1253 
1.47 
0.60 
0.55 
0.1492 
0.5512 
0.5839 
-0.009 
-0.021 
-0.027 
0.0545 
0.0393 
0.0480 
 
H5 
Difference 
between 
brand name 
altering and 
non-brand 
name 
altering 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
 
-
0.0016 
0.0170 
0.0260 
0.1078 
0.1226 
0.1297 
-0.08 
0.81 
1.08 
0.9372 
0.4189 
0.2800 
-0.0412 
-0.0280 
-0.0215 
0.0380 
0.0620 
0.0740 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
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TABLE 6 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECTS OF  
CORPORATE NAME CHANGES AFTER EXCLUDING OUTLIERS  
Hypo- 
thesis I.V. D.V. N 
Change 
in Stock 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-
Value 
Prob > 
|t| 
Lower 
CL 
Mean 
Upper 
CL 
Mean 
Notes 
H1 
Change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
115 
0.0123 
0.0069 
0.0146 
0.0525 
0.0705 
0.1291 
2.52 
1.05 
1.67 
0.0133 
0.2948 
0.0978 
0.0026 
-0.006 
-0.003 
0.0220 
0.0199 
0.0320 
Supported 
Not Supp 
Part Supp 
 
Change in 
corporate 
entity 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
50 
0.0029 
-0.011 
-0.023 
0.0587 
0.0763 
0.0737 
0.36 
-1.06 
-2.21 
0.7238 
0.2956 
0.0319 
-0.014 
-0.033 
-0.044 
0.0196 
0.0103 
-0.002 
 
H2 
Major CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
75 
0.0155 
0.0092 
0.0157 
0.0581 
0.0817 
0.1424 
2.31 
0.98 
1.27 
0.0238 
0.3323 
0.2074 
0.0021 
-0.010 
-0.009 
0.0288 
0.0280 
0.0921 
Supported 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
 
 
Minor CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
38 
0.0058 
0.0024 
0.0095 
0.0410 
0.0437 
0.0616 
0.88 
0.34 
0.95 
0.3853 
0.7378 
0.3507 
-0.008 
-0.012 
-0.011 
0.0193 
0.0168 
0.0297 
 
H3 
Difference 
between Major 
and Minor 
CNC 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
 
0.0096 
0.0068 
0.0062 
0.0530 
0.0713 
0.0942 
1.02 
0.58 
0.39 
0.3107 
0.5649 
0.6951 
-0.011 
-0.021 
-0.031 
0.0305 
0.0350 
0.0434 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
H4 
Non-brand 
name altering 
CNC related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
73 
0.0078 
0.0051 
0.0157 
0.0542 
0.0737 
0.0932 
1.23 
0.59 
1.44 
0.2242 
0.5548 
0.1537 
-0.005 
-0.012 
-0.006 
0.0204 
0.0223 
0.0375 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
 
Brand name 
altering CNC 
related to 
change in 
corporate 
image 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
40 
0.0201 
0.0071 
0.0116 
0.0487 
0.0629 
0.0971 
2.61 
0.71 
0.76 
0.0128 
0.4801 
0.4538 
0.0045 
-0.013 
-0.019 
0.0357 
0.0272 
0.0427 
 
H5 
Difference 
between brand 
name altering 
and non-brand 
name altering 
(-1, +1) 
(-2, +2) 
(-3, +3) 
 
-0.0123 
-0.0020 
0.0040 
0.0524 
0.0701 
0.0946 
-1.20 
-0.14 
0.22 
0.2342 
0.8865 
0.8254 
-0.0327 
-0.0293 
-0.0328 
0.0080 
0.0250 
0.0410 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
Not Supp 
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TABLE 7 
KEY RESULTS OF PREVIOUS EVENT STUDIES OF  
CORPORATE NAME CHANGES 
 Effect Size 
Event Window 
(business days 
examined) 
Robustness Checks 
Howe (1982) 
121 firms 
1962-1980 
19 years 
0.07% 
(p>0.05) 
 
(-1 week, +1 
week) 
Examined weekly CARs for 
each of the nine weeks 
surrounding the CNC 
announcement. 
Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 
(1987) 
58 firms 
1981-1985 
5 years 
0.61% 
(t=2.15, p <0.02) 
 
(-1, 0) none 
Ferris (1988) 
1983-1985 
3 years 
4.32% 
(t=2.628, p<0.05) Day 0 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the five business days (-2, 
+2) surrounding the CNC 
announcement 
Bosch and 
Hirschey (1989) 
79 firms 
1979-1986 
8 years 
0.75% 
 (t=1.74, p<0.1) 
 
Day 0 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the eleven business days 
preceding (-10, 0), the ten 
business days (-4, +5) 
surrounding, and the ten 
business days following (+1, 
+10) the CNC announcement 
Madura and 
Tucker (1990) 
12 firms 
1987-1989 
3 years 
0.097% 
(t=.078, p>0.05) Day 0 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the eleven business days (-5, 
+5) surrounding the CNC 
announcement 
Morris and 
Reyes (1991) 
28 firms 
1979-1985 
7 years 
-5.817% 
(t=-7.7288, p<.0001) (-14, +2) none 
Harawa (1992) 
160 firms 
1970-84 
15 years 
-0.152% 
(p>0.05) (0, +1) 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the sixty-one business days 
(-30, +30), as well as the three 
business day (-1, +1) event 
window surrounding the CNC 
announcement 
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TABLE 7 CONTINUED 
 Effect Size 
Event Window 
(business days 
examined) 
Robustness Checks 
Karpoff  and 
Rankine (1994) 
123 firms 
1979-1987 
9 years 
1.56% 
 (z=2.76, p<0.05) 
 
(-1, 0) 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the seven business days (-1, 
+5) surrounding the CNC 
announcement 
Koku (1997) 
22 firms 
1980-1990 
11 years 
Difference of 3.67 in P/E 
ratio 
(t=2.28, p<0.05) 
(-5, +5 yrs) 
Examined annual P/E ratios for 
each of the 11 years (-5, +5 
years) surrounding the CNC 
announcement 
Cooper, Dimi-
trov, and Rau 
(2001) 
95 firms 
1998-1999 
2 years 
18% 
(t=7.31) (0, +1) 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the five business days (-2, 
+2) surrounding the CNC 
announcement as well as the 
fourteen business days 
preceding (-15, -2), and the 
fourteen business days (+2, 
+15) following the CNC 
announcement. 
Lee (2001) 
114 firms 
1995-1999 
5 years 
2.70% (-1, +1) none 
Cooper, 
Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, 
and Rau (2005) 
250 firms 
1998-2001 
3 years 
10.60% 
(t=2.58) (0, +1) 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the five business days (-2, 
+2) surrounding, as well as the 
fourteen business day window 
(-15, -2) preceding, the 
fourteen business day window 
(+2, +15) following, the thirty 
business day window (+1, +30) 
following, and the sixty-one 
business day window (-30, 
+30) surrounding the CNC 
announcement. 
Karbhari, Sori 
and Mohamad 
(2004) 1984-96  
13 years 
-8% 
(t=-2.57) (-10, +10) 
Examined daily CARs for each 
of the eleven business days (-
10, 0) preceding and the ten 
business days (+1, +10) 
following the CNC 
announcement. 
DeFanti 
(2006) 
183 firms 
1987-2002 
16 years 
1.23% 
(t=2.52, p<0.05) (-1, +1) 
Examined the CARs for the 
five business day (-2, +2) and 
seven business day (-3, +3) 
windows surrounding the CNC 
announcement. 
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DISCUSSION: SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This section is comprised of the following sections. The first section presents a 
general overview of the dissertation. The second section summarizes the key findings 
and discusses them within the context of the theoretical support for the conceptual model 
and hypotheses. Since, the limitations of the study may somewhat temper these findings, 
the third section provides a brief discussion of the limitations. The fourth section 
discusses future research directions, identifies additional variables to be considered in 
the further study of corporate name changes, and specifies the implications of the 
findings for managers and researchers. The fifth and final section presents a brief set of 
concluding comments. 
General Overview of the Dissertation 
Even before the advertising campaign to promote a new corporate name is 
considered, the cost of a CNC can amount to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars 
be very costly (Bennett 1986; Callahan 2002; Ellis 1987; McQuade 1984; Stuart and 
Muzellac 2004; USA Today 1987). Therefore, the financial consequences of CNCs are 
of great consequence to managers. More specifically, managers and researchers alike 
should be highly interested in differentiating between the stock price effect of: 1) a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image versus a change in corporate entity; 2) a major 
change versus a minor change to the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in 
corporate image; and 3) a non-brand name altering versus a brand name altering CNC 
related to a change in corporate image.  
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Methodology.  This dissertation adopts the event study methodology from the 
modern theory of finance to analyze the effect of 183 CNCs occurring between 1987 and 
2002. As such, each of the five steps of event studies were conducted, including: 1) 
identifying the event, 2) defining the criteria for including a particular event in the 
sample, 3) calculating normal and abnormal returns, 4) estimating the normal 
performance model, and 5) performing statistical and hypotheses tests (Srinivasan and 
Bharadwaj 2004). 
To complete the first step, a firm’s first CNC announcement was identified as the 
event because only a CNC announcement which was unanticipated by investors should 
cause a change in the firm’s stock price. This identified 814 CNC announcements that 
were made during the period of 1987 to 2002. In the second step, to define the criteria 
for inclusion of a particular CNC announcement in the sample, it was ensured that no 
other announcements were made during the seven business day event window 
surrounding the CNC announcement in order to avoid comprising the analysis with the 
multiple treatment effect comprised of the CNC’s effect on stock price and the separate 
effect on the firm’s stock price of the other announcements (e.g., acquisition, new 
product announcement, earnings, dividends, etc.). After removing those CNC 
announcements which were made with other concurrent announcements, the sample was 
reduced from 814 to 183 CNCs between 1987 and 2002. Fortunately, the size of this 
reduced sample still permitted analysis of hypotheses (e.g., brand name altering versus 
non-brand name altering) that had not been considered by previous researchers perhaps 
due to insufficient sample size. 
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To complete the third and fourth steps, Wharton Data Research Services’ 
Eventus software was used to calculate the normal returns of the overall stock market, 
calculate the abnormal returns that have been attributed to the CNC announcements, and 
estimate the normal performance model. For the fifth step, to test the hypotheses, t-tests 
have been conducted to determine whether the difference between the hypothesized 
stock price effects and zero are statistically significant during the three business day 
event window (-1, +1) surrounding the CNC announcement.  
Summary of findings. The general hypothesis of this dissertation is that a major, 
non-brand altering CNC related to a change in corporate image would have a statistically 
significant, positive effect upon a firm’s stock price.  While the empirical findings 
generally support this overall hypothesis, neither the difference between a major and a 
minor change to the corporate name nor the difference between a non-brand name 
altering and a brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate image was 
statistically significant. The specific findings were as follows. 
As expected, a CNC related to a change in corporate image had a statistically 
significant, positive mean CAR of 2.20% upon the firm’s stock price for the three 
business day event window of (-1, +1).  This stock price effect also approached 
statistical significance in the five business day window (-2, +2) with a mean CAR was 
2.08% and was statistically significant and positive in the seven business day window  
(-3, +3) as well, with a mean CAR of 2.73%. In addition, when the outliers were 
removed, the stock price effect approached statistical significance with a mean CAR of 
1.23% for the three business day event window (-1, +1), but was statistically 
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insignificant with a mean CAR of 0.69% for the five business day window (-2, +2). It 
was also statistically insignificant for the seven business day window (-3, +3) with a 
mean CAR of 1.46%. 
In addition, although the null hypothesis was not offered, it was expected that a 
CNC related to a change in corporate entity should have a statistically insignificant 
effect on stock price because the stock price effect is mostly captured at the time of the 
announcement of the change in corporate entity. This expectation was confirmed within 
the three business day event window (-1, +1) with a statistically insignificant mean CAR 
of 0.31%. 
A major change to the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in 
corporate image, as expected, had a statistically significant positive mean CAR of 2.87% 
for the three business day window (-1, +1). In addition, the positive stock price effect 
approached statistical significance in the five business day window (-2, +2) with a mean 
CAR of 2.91% and was positive and statistically significant in the seven business day 
window with a mean CAR of 3.27%. In addition, when the outliers were removed, the 
stock price effect was positive and statistically significant for the three business day 
event window (-1, +1) with a mean CAR of 1.55%, but was statistically insignificant 
both in the five business day window (-2, +2) with a mean CAR of 0.92% and in the 
seven business day window (-3, +3) with a mean CAR of 1.57%..  
Contrary to expectations, a minor change to the corporate name did not have a 
lesser effect on a firm’s stock price than a major change to the corporate name during a 
CNC related to a change in corporate image. Although the effect size of the difference in 
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CARs was 2.1% in magnitude, it was statistically insignificant for the three business day 
event window (-1, +1). It was also statistically insignificant in the five business day and 
seven business day windows with statistically insignificant differences in CARs of 
2.55% and 1.97%, respectively. After the outliers were removed, the difference in CARs 
diminished to a statistically insignificant 0.96% for the three business day event window 
(-1, +1), a statistically insignificant 0.68% for the five business day window (-2, +2), and 
a statistically insignificant 0.62% for the seven business day window (-3, +3). 
In summary, a major change to the corporate name during a CNC is, on average, 
statistically significant and positive, whereas a minor change to the corporate name 
during a CNC is, on average, statistically insignificant. However, the difference between 
a major change and a minor change is statistically insignificant with respect to the firm’s 
stock price when the purpose of the CNC is to create a different corporate image.  
As expected, a non-brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate 
image approached statistical significance with a positive mean CAR of 2.14% upon the 
firm’s stock price for the three business day event window of (-1, +1).  This stock price 
effect also approached statistical significance in the five business day window (-2, +2) 
with a mean CAR of 2.81% and was statistically significant and positive in the seven 
business day window (-3, +3) as well, with a mean CAR of 3.64%. However, when the 
outliers were removed, the stock price effect was no longer statistically significant for 
the three business day event window (-1, +1), five business day window (-2, +2), or 
seven business day window (-3, +3), with mean CARs of 0.78%, 0.51%, and 1.57%, 
respectively.  
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In contrast, it was surprising to find that a brand name altering CNC related to a 
change in corporate image did not have a lesser effect on a firm’s stock price than a non-
brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate image. As opposed to the 
statistically significant, positive CAR of 2.14% for the non-brand name altering CNCs, 
the mean CAR of 2.30% for the brand name altering CNCs was found to be statistically 
insignificant for the three business day event window (-1, +1) due to the relatively 
smaller subsample size. Hence, the effect size of the difference between the two was a 
statistically insignificant -0.16% CAR.  In addition, the differences in the effect sizes for 
the non-brand name altering and brand name altering CNCs were found to be 
statistically insignificant in the five business day and seven business day windows as 
well, with CARs of 1.70% and 2.60%, respectively. After the outliers were removed, the 
difference in CARs diminished to a statistically insignificant -1.23% for the three 
business day event window (-1, +1), a statistically insignificant -0.20% for the five 
business day window (-2, +2), and a statistically insignificant 0.40% for the seven 
business day window (-3, +3). 
In summary, a non-brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate 
image is, on average, statistically significant and positive, whereas a brand name altering 
CNC related to a change in corporate image is, on average, statistically insignificant. 
However, the difference between a non-brand name altering CNC and a brand name 
altering CNC is statistically insignificant with respect to the firm’s stock price when the 
purpose of the CNC is to create a different corporate image.  
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Limitations 
The sixteen-year time frame of the research presents several methodological 
challenges. For instance, it was difficult to find supplemental information about some of 
the individual firms in the sample, which made it challenging in some cases to assess 
whether or not a brand name was altered. Another concern is that the antecedent 
categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, firms often acquire or divest another 
business during the year preceding a CNC related to a change in corporate image. For 
these reasons, CNC announcements were retained in the sample only if the press releases 
or additional research (e.g., reviewing annual reports) provided sufficient information for 
them to be classified as belonging in one, and only one, antecedent category (i.e., change 
in corporate image versus corporate entity) or as one type of CNC (i.e., major or minor 
change to the corporate name; brand name altering versus non-brand name altering). 
 In addition, because the Internet was widely adopted during the tail end of the 
sixteen-year period spanning from January 1987 to December 2002, it made it somewhat 
difficult to choose a proper event period with which to measure the stock price effect of 
CNCs. Ultimately, the three business day event window was chosen in order to permit 
for information leakage to occur up to one day before a CNC was publicly announced 
and for investors to take up to one day after the CNC announcement to learn about it. 
While these are reasonable assumptions for CNCs that occurred prior to the advent of 
the Internet, it is more likely that the stock price effects of CNC announcements are now 
captured on the actual day of the announcement since analysts and investors alike would 
be able to learn of the announcement much more rapidly. 
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The empirical results of this dissertation are subject to limitations as well.  First, 
the results for Hypothesis 4 were sensitive to outliers. Specifically, when outliers were 
taken into account, the stock price effect of a non-brand name altering CNC diminished 
from a positive CAR of 2.14%, which approached statistical significance, to a 
statistically insignificant CAR of 0.78%.  
Second, they are sensitive to power. It is possible that H3 was not supported 
because of low power since there are only 40 observations in the subsample of minor, 
image-related CNCs. Typically, a difference of about 2% in CAR should in general be 
significant if the sample is large enough.  
 Third, not all researchers concur with the semistrong form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis, which represents a compromise between the strong and weak forms. 
On one hand, strong-form holds that stock prices reflect all pertinent information 
whether or not it has been publicly announced. On the other hand, the weak-form argues 
that all information contained in price movements from the past are fully reflected in 
current market prices. As such, the semistrong-form concludes that current market prices 
reflect all publicly available information. 
 Some researchers have questioned the assumptions of the semistrong efficient 
markets hypothesis, including that investors are rational, have structural knowledge of 
the economy, and have complete knowledge of the “laws of nature” that govern the 
relationships between economic variables.  As such, the structural knowledge 
assumption has been relaxed by an alternative “rational learning” or “structural 
uncertainty” stream of research that has been offered in the finance literature (Brav and 
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Heaton 2002; Brennan and Xia 2001; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Kurz 1994; 
Lewellen and Shenken 2002; Lewis 1989). Since the semistrong efficient markets 
hypothesis remains the dominant perspective, which has been adopted by all previous 
CNC event studies, this dissertation eschews the rational expectations hypothesis in 
favor of the semistrong efficient markets hypothesis. 
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation will serve as the beginning of a programmatic effort to advance 
the understanding of the antecedents and consequences of CNCs.  In the future, an 
examination will be made of the difference in the impact of brand name altering CNCs 
versus non-brand name altering CNCs on the stock prices of service firms, business-to-
business firms, and firms with positive versus negative previous financial performance. 
Brand name altering CNCs by service firms. Other than Koku (1997), no 
previous study of CNCs examined the difference in their specific impact on services 
firms. Failing to do so can result in an aggregation bias (Koku 1997). Service firms are 
similar to manufacturing firms in that they will also suffer a loss of brand awareness and 
brand heritage when they undergo brand altering CNCs. However, service firms are 
different from manufacturing firms in that services firms’ brand name altering CNCs 
will be more negatively impacted by the CNC signaling effects, dual purpose of a 
service firm’s corporate name (i.e., the corporate name also serves as a primary brand 
name), perceived risk, intangibility, and the prominence of experience and credence 
attributes. It is these differences that increase the risk of a brand name altering CNC by a 
service firm. 
   127
CNC signaling effects. Due to its high cost, a CNC can serve as an effective 
signal of a firm’s other organizational changes (Bosch and Hirschey 1989; Ferris 1988; 
Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Koku 1997; Lee 1999; Morris and Reyes 1990). 
However, service firms vary greatly from manufacturing firms in their signaling 
attributes. For example, when a manufacturing firm communicates a change in the 
direction in terms of the quality of its products, it is relatively easy for a customer to 
verify the change in quality by examining tangible products such as candy bars and 
clothes as well as durable products such as refrigerators, cars, computers, and television 
sets. It is much more difficult to do so with services (Koku 1997) and this increases the 
uncertainty created by a service firm’s brand name altering CNC. 
Dual purpose of a service firm’s corporate name. For all firms, the corporate 
brand defines the organization that will deliver and stand behind its product or service 
offering. Without question, the corporate brand is unique in a manufacturing firm’s 
brand portfolio in that it represents an organization as well as a product. For instance, the 
corporate brand can help to differentiate the firm by providing credibility and facilitating 
brand management (See Aaker 2004).  
In a service firm, however, the corporate brand is even more important and often 
serves the dual purpose of both naming the firm and functioning as one of its primary 
brands or even its only brand. If the brand facing the customer changes when a services 
firm changes its corporate name, a great deal of brand equity is lost (e.g., 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Consulting to Monday). Corporate brands are defined 
primarily by organizational associations, which may be relevant to product brands, but 
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the number, power, and credibility of organizational associations will be greater for a 
corporate brand that clearly represents the firm as a whole (Aaker 2004).  This is often 
the case with service firms’ corporate brands.  
Perceived risk. Perceived risk can be defined as the uncertainty and 
consequences of the decision affects the extent of the search and information sought 
(Bauer 1960; Laroche, MacDougall, Bergeron, and Yang 2004). Its components include 
social, financial, physical, psychological, time, and performance risk (Laroche, 
MacDougall, Bergeron, and Yang 2004; Stone and Gronhaug 1993). 
As was the case with major CNCs, the announcement of a service firm’s CNC 
might positively affect customers’ reception (i.e., acknowledging the new corporate 
name), but might have a negative affect on yielding (i.e., choosing to utilize the service) 
due to the perceived risk and uncertainty about the firm that the new name introduces.  
Customers’ perceived risk is a major issue for service firms because of services’ 
intangibility (Zeithaml 1981; Laroche, McDougall, Bergeron, and Yang 1994), 
heterogeneity, and inseparability (Guseman 1981; Mitchell and Greatorex 1993). Among 
service firms, perceived risk is higher with professional services than non-professional 
services due their cost and credence qualities. Perceived risk is also higher with 
organizational (B2B) services than consumer (B2C) services due to their effect on 
people other than the purchaser (Mitchell, Moutinho, and Lewis 2003). 
Intangibility. Researchers have already recognized that the power of the 
corporate name may be even stronger with intangibles. For example, Keller (2003) 
suggests that in many cases, when the possible product benefits are less concrete, the 
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creative potential of the brand name and other brand elements play a more important role 
in capturing the intangible characteristics of a brand. 
The intangibility of services contributes to their perceived risk because the more 
intangible a product or service is, the more difficult its evaluation will be (Finn 1985; 
Laroche, McDougall, Bergeron, and Yang 2004; McDougall and Snetsinger 1990; 
Mitchell and Greatorex 1993; Murray and Schactler 1990; Zeithaml 1981; Zeithaml and 
Bitner 2000). Since branding increases tangibility (Berry 1980; Berry and Clark 1986), 
the intangibility of services requires customers to place more trust in a brand and, as 
previously mentioned, when this brand changes during a CNC, customers are likely to be 
adversely affected by the uncertainty created. Supporting this argument are empirical 
findings which show that brands are superior to generics in combating perceived 
psychological risk, performance risk, and financial risk (see Laroche, MacDougall, 
Bergeron, and Yang 2004).  
 Another concern with services is the difficulty that customers face when they 
attempt to compare one service to another. With tangible products, firms can delineate 
the quality in specific ways that can be used by prospective customers to judge them 
against one another prior to purchase. Case in point, consumer packaged goods can list 
their ingredients on the packaging and computers can be classified by their amount of 
memory in gigabytes or processing speed in megahertz to describe their expected 
performance. In contrast, services do not allow such impartial comparisons to be made 
(Koku 1997).  
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Related to a service firm’s intangibility is its credence and experience attributes 
(Darby and Karni 1973; Nelson 1970; Zeithaml 1981). For example, whereas products 
such as automobiles possess search qualities that can be compared before they are 
purchased, customers cannot attest to experience qualities such as the quality of food and 
services at a restaurant prior to making a purchase (Koku 1997). The same can be said of 
the credence qualities offered by universities, physicians, and management consultants.  
Various researchers have asserted that customers take a chance when they 
purchase experience goods because, unlike search goods, experience goods cannot be 
inspected for quality prior to purchase (Nelson 1970; Darby and Karni 1973; Bharadwaj, 
Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993). As a result, firms often find it difficult to convince 
customers to take a chance on a new brand when they are possess knowledge about the 
quality of the incumbent's product through prior use (Schmalensee 1982; Bharadwaj, 
Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993). In addition, variability in service quality also makes the 
consumers' purchase choices more complex (Murray 1991; Nayyar and Templeton 1991; 
Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993). Although consumers may seek more 
information to make better choices, since information search is generally expensive 
(Stigler 1961; Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993), customers may choose the 
product with the best brand reputation because it has the lowest evaluation costs (Rumelt 
1987; Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993). 
Given that customers rely on brand reputation in order to reduce their risk when 
purchasing experience goods, it may be disconcerting to them when a firm undergoes a 
radical, utility producing change to a dual purpose corporate name.  Moreover, the 
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customers’ perceived risk will likely increase when the new corporate name is mistaken 
for a completely new brand. For example, if a customer observes that his or her favorite 
restaurant has changed its name, he or she may assume that it is under new ownership 
and may have hired a new chef.  This will likely increase the customer’s perceived risk 
and make the customer less likely to return to the restaurant. Since the restaurant is an 
experience good, this risk is mitigated somewhat by the fact that one additional visit to 
the restaurant will enable the customer to gauge whether the newly named restaurant is 
worthy of his or her continued patronage. 
In sum, a brand name altering CNC is risky for any firm because of the 
aforementioned loss of brand awareness and brand heritage. However, it is even more 
risky for a service firm due to the negative impact of CNC signaling effects, the dual 
purpose of a service firm’s corporate name, perceived risk, intangibility, and the 
prominence of experience and credence attributes. Hence, one might expect that, a non-
brand name altering CNC by a services firm will have a greater effect on the firm’s stock 
price than a brand name altering CNC by a services firm. 
Previous firm performance. High economic performance signals a firm’s 
inherent quality to creditors and investors. The greater a firm’s current market 
performance, the greater a firm’s reputation (Fombrun and Shanley 1990: 238). For 
example, Fortune Magazine's annual ratings of America's largest corporations are shown 
to be heavily influenced by previous financial results (Beckwith and Lehmann 1975; 
Brown and Perry 1994; Cooper 1981; Dillon, Mulani, and Frederick, 1984; 194; 
Holbrook 1983; Myers 1965; Pulakos, Schmitt, and Ostroff 1986; Thorndike 1920).  In 
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fact, Brown and Perry (1994) point out that financial performance (i.e., combinations of 
accounting returns, stock market returns, sales growth, size, operating leverage, etc.) has 
explained from 42 percent (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Branch 1990) to 53 percent 
(Fombrun and Shanley 1990) of the variance (i.e., adjusted R²) of the overall rating of 
firm quality in the Fortune survey.  
Therefore, it follows that firms that have performed below the market for the 
year preceding a CNC are more likely to improve their performance after the CNC either 
by recovering lost market share or signaling other forthcoming changes, which are more 
likely to happen and succeed in a firm which has been relatively inefficient prior to the 
changes (Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987). For example, Ball (1972) illustrates how 
poorly performing firms are more likely to change their accounting methods (Horsky 
and Swyngedouw 1987). 
Hence, one might expect that a CNC by a firm with negative previous stock 
performance will have a positive effect upon the firm’s stock price will have a greater 
effect on the firm’s stock price that a CNC by a firm with positive previous stock 
performance. 
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Implications  
As indicated in Table 8, the previous research on CNCs in the marketing, 
finance, management, economics, and business history literatures has focused primarily 
on either the antecedents of CNCs (i.e., change in corporate image versus change in 
corporate entity) or the degree of change to the corporate name (i.e., major versus 
minor). Although Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) attempted to compare the stock price 
effects of major versus minor changes to the corporate name during CNC related to a 
change in corporate image, their classification of a CNC related to a change in corporate 
entity was insufficient. More specifically, they classified a CNC as related to a change in 
corporate entity when the CNC announcement also made reference to that change in 
corporate entity rather than identifying all firms that had undergone a change in 
corporate entity within the year preceding the CNC announcement, as was done by this 
dissertation. Finally, no previous study of CNCs examined the stock price effect related 
to whether the CNC altered any of the firm’s brands. 
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TABLE 8 
SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION OF PREVIOUS EVENT STUDIES OF 
CORPORATE NAME CHANGES 
Previous study; 
(year published) 
N; time period 
-- 
Variable studied 
Change in 
corporate 
image 
Change in 
corporate entity
Major versus 
minor change 
to corporate 
name 
Brand name 
altering versus 
non-brand 
name altering 
Howe 
1982 
121 firms 
1962-198  0
19 years 
X    
Horsky and 
Swyngedouw 
1987 
58 firms 
1981-1985 
5 years 
  X  
Ferris 
1988 
1983-1985 
3 years 
X X   
Bosch and Hirschey 1989 
79 firms 
1979-1986 
8 years 
 X X  
Madura and Tucker 1990 
12 firms 
1987-1989 
3 years 
 
    
Morris and Reyes  
1991 
28 firms 
1979-1985 
7 years 
 
X    
Harawa 
1992 
160 firms 
15 years 
 
    
Karpoff 
1994 
123 firms 
1979-1987 
9 years 
X    
Koku 
1997 
22 firms 
1980-1990 
11 years 
X    
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TABLE 8 CONTINUED 
Previous study; 
(year published) 
N; time period 
-- 
Variable studied 
Change in 
corporate 
image 
Change in 
corporate entity
Major versus 
minor change 
to corporate 
name 
Brand name 
altering versus 
non-brand 
name altering 
Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 
2001 
95 firms 
1998-1999 
2 years 
 
X    
Lee 
2001 
114 firms 
1995-1999 
5 years 
X    
Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, 
Patel, and Rau 2004 
250 firms 
1998-2001 
3 years 
X    
Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 
2004 
18 firms 
13 years 
 
X X   
DeFanti 
(2006) 
183 firms 
1987-200  2
16 years 
X X X X 
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This dissertation’s examination of the relationship between a CNC related to a 
change in corporate image and a firm’s stock price addresses an issue of primary 
concern to both managers and academicians. By differentiating between a CNC related 
to a change in corporate image versus a change in corporate entity, major and minor 
changes to the corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image, and 
non-brand name altering and brand name altering CNCs related to a change in corporate 
image, this dissertation expands, refines, and casts potential doubt on these conclusions. 
More specifically, the statistically significant, positive effect that a CNC related to a 
change in corporate entity has on a firm’s stock price supports the contention that a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image may indeed positively affect investors’ 
expectations of the future demand for a firm’s goods or services and need not be 
restricted to merely serving as a signal of other organizational changes. Such an 
assertion can be made because an increase in the firm’s stock price represents an 
increase in the firm’s cash flows, which, in turn, is caused by an increase in the demand 
of a firm’s products and services. 
By examining CNCs between 1987 and 2002, this dissertation has also overcome 
perhaps the most important methodological limitation that was encountered by previous 
researchers of CNCs. To address the potential limitation that confounding events can 
contribute to the noise in stock prices and make it difficult to isolate the stock price of an 
event such as a CNC, firms which made concurrent announcements of financially 
relevant events during the seven business days surrounding the event were removed 
from the sample. 
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As discussed previously, although Brown and Warner’s (1985) simulation found 
simultaneous events to have a statistically insignificant average effect on firms’ stock 
prices, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have argued that confounding events can 
contribute to the noise in stock prices, make it difficult to isolate the stock price of an 
event, and should be removed from the sample. To address this potential limitation, 
McWilliams and Siegel’s (1997) more conservative approach is adopted by this 
dissertation. Thus, firms which made concurrent announcements of financially relevant 
events during the seven business days surrounding the event were removed from the 
sample. 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), if a firm were to announce a 
financially relevant event during the event window of the announcement of the event 
being examined, then it should be removed from the sample. For example, firms might 
declare dividends, announce an impending merger, sign a major contract, announce a 
new project, file a large lawsuit, or announce unexpected earnings. Since the event study 
method attributes the abnormal return to a particular event, if other financially relevant 
events are occurring during the event window, it makes it difficult to isolate the impact 
of the event under consideration (McWilliams and Siegel 1997).   
Another important methodological refinement of previous CNC event studies 
made by this dissertation is its robustness checks of outliers.  It departed from the great 
majority of previous CNC studies in that only three (Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; 
Karpoff and Rankine 1994; Lee 2001) of the previous thirteen CNC event studies 
conducted robustness checks for outliers.  
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Finally, the effect size of the statistically significant, positive mean CAR of 
2.20% for CNCs related to a change in corporate image for the three business day event 
window of (-1, +1) compares favorably with previous studies of CNCs. Horsky and 
Swyngedouw (1987) found a CAR of 0.61% for CNCs related to a change in corporate 
image and Bosch and Hirschey (1989) found a CAR of 0.75% for minor changes to the 
corporate name during a CNC related to a change in corporate image. The effect sizes 
reported in Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) and Bosch and Hirschey (1989)’s findings 
regarding the stock price effect of a CNC related to a change in corporate image may be 
compromised because of the way in which they classified CNCs.  In particular, they 
appeared to classify CNCs as related to a change in corporate entity only when the 
change in corporate entity was mentioned in the CNC announcement. In doing so, they 
likely classified many CNCs related to a change in corporate entity as CNCs related to a 
change in corporate image and therefore failed to get a truly accurate measure of the 
stock price effect of a CNC related to a change in corporate image. A more appropriate 
classification would have been to classify CNCs as related to a change in corporate 
entity when the firm had undergone a change in corporate entity within a year of the 
CNC announcement, as was done in this dissertation. 
In closing, Horsky and Swyngedouw’s seminal study of CNCs in the marketing 
literature found that CNCs do indeed significantly affect firms’ stock prices, but they do 
so through by signaling other changes occurring within the firm rather than by increasing 
the demand for a firm’s products or services. Moreover, Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) concluded that the difference between a minor change and a major change to the 
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corporate name is statistically insignificant. With the exception of a few studies 
pertaining to Internet-related CNCs (Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001; Cooper, Khorana, 
Osobov, Patel, Rau 2004; Lee 2001;), the great majority of the previous studies of CNCs 
have generally concurred with these conclusions. 
In contrast, the statistically significant, positive stock price effect of a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image indicates that, on average, investors expect the 
firm to have increased future cash flows as a result of the CNC. This supports the 
contention that a CNC related to a change in corporate image may indeed positively 
affect the demand for a firm’s goods or services and need not be restricted to merely 
serving as a signal of other organizational changes. 
Conclusion 
Drawing from the theoretical concepts of information processing (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983), brand equity (Aaker 
1991), brand heritage (Aaker 2004), CNC signaling effects (Bosch and Hirschey 1989; 
Ferris 1988; Horsky and Swyngedouw 1987; Karbhari, Sori, and Mohamad 2004; Koku 
1997; Lee 2001), perceived risk (Bauer 1960; Laroche, MacDougall, Bergeron, and 
Yang 2004; Stone and Gronhaug 1993; Zeithaml 1981), and signaling theory (Spence 
1973), this dissertation demonstrates that by failing to differentiate between a CNC 
related to a change in corporate image and a change in corporate entity, many 
researchers may have overgeneralized when they concluded that a CNC does not affect a 
firm’s stock price or that the distinction between a major and a minor change to the 
corporate name does not matter. This dissertation both expands and refines the previous 
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research on CNCs (see Table 3) by recognizing that: 1) a CNC related to a change in 
corporate image will have a positive impact on stock price whereas a CNC related to a 
change in corporate entity will not; 2) a major CNC related to a change in corporate 
image will have a positive impact on a firm’s stock price whereas a minor CNC related 
to a change in corporate image will not; and 3) a non-brand name altering CNC related 
to a change in corporate image will have a positive impact on a firm’s stock price where 
as a brand name altering CNC related to a change in corporate image will not.  
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